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This thesis investigates general equilibrium asset prices in non-competitive markets in
which monopolistic traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators (MAX) coexist. Extrapolators
form beliefs about the probability distribution of future asset prices based on sentiment,
which is determined by historical asset prices. Arbitrageurs trade on mispricing but
experience the limits of arbitrage, and monopolistic traders hold correct beliefs and
market power. Chapter 1 provides a research overview. Chapter 2 presents a discrete-
time model and investigates monopolistic traders’ optimal strategies. We argue that
the equilibrium price is determined not by monopolistic traders’ current assets alone,
but by the sequence of trades that acquired them. Monopolistic traders’ decisions
of placing a large block order or sequential small orders depend on both market
conditions and other agents’ strategies. The pump-and-dump and optimal liquidation
strategies offer two examples. Results from this study explain many market phenomena,
such as asset price bubbles and flash crashes, which have significant implications for
financial institutions. Chapter 3 presents a continuous-time model. The model generates
asset pricing characteristics, such as high equity premiums and excess volatility, while
maintaining the persistence of risk-free rate and the predictability of dividend price ratio.
The model proposes hypotheses and provides theoretical foundations for empirical asset
pricing research, and can be used to guide profitable investment strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
This thesis examines a topic in theoretical asset pricing and behavioral finance,
investigating general equilibrium asset prices in non-competitive markets with the
coexistence of monopolistic traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators. The model relaxes
traditional asset pricing model assumptions, such as rational agents and competitive
markets, and was developed in both discrete- and continuous-time contexts. The discrete-
time model explores optimal trading strategies, including optimal execution and market
manipulation. The continuous-time model studies the relationship between asset returns
and various economic conditions, generating findings regarding asset pricing, such
as equity premium and excess volatility. The continuous-time model also proposes
hypotheses and provides theoretical foundations to empirical asset pricing research.
The model applies a context of extrapolators similar to De Long et al. (1990b); Hong
and Stein (1999); Barberis et al. (2015a,b). The investors form beliefs about the probability
distribution of future asset prices based on sentiment, which is determined by historical
asset prices instead of asset characteristics, and the influence decays. For example, if
asset prices increased during the past several months, extrapolators expect them to keep
increasing during the subsequent month. If a significant price increase occurred in the
most recent month, extrapolators expect prices to also increase significantly during the
next month. Extrapolators optimize consumption and investment strategies accordingly.
The innovation of this study is that it includes endogenous arbitrageurs who suffer
from limits of arbitrage, which several studies discuss (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). I
model arbitrageurs’ investment strategies as a mean-reverting, drift-diffusion process
based on mispricing, during which mispricing is defined as the difference between
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fundamental and equilibrium asset prices. Fundamental asset prices are obtained by
solving a general equilibrium model with rational investors alone. The equilibrium asset
prices are calculated endogenously using the underlying general equilibrium problem.
The convergence rate serves as a liquidity indicator, and the diffusion term serves as
noise information.
The primary contribution of this study is the introduction of monopolistic traders
and an endogenous price impact function, whereas extant literature commonly assumes
an exogenous function. Jarrow (1992) examines large traders’ roles during market
manipulation by specifying a convex price impact function exogenously. Different from
extant research and acknowledging that price impact functions essentially describe the
supply and demand relationship of an underlying asset, I apply the market clearing
condition in the general equilibrium model as a price impact function. I therefore relax
the competitive market assumption by having monopolistic traders incorporate market
clearing conditions in their optimization problem. Monopolistic traders also incorporate
other agents’ strategies when making investment decisions.
The discrete-time model derives general equilibrium asset prices as a function of
monopolistic traders’ entire trading history. Monopolistic traders can thus exploit
irrational investors and form optimal trading strategies based on their objective functions.
I discuss optimal liquidation and market manipulation strategies as two examples.
Monopolistic traders’ choice of a large block order or sequential small orders depends
on market conditions, and profitability varies across markets. I also show that in a
plain economy without a fundamental shock and zero initial sentiment, no market
manipulation strategy is profitable.
The continuous-time model simultaneously reproduces many characteristics of asset
2
pricing. Market power enables monopolistic traders to require higher expected returns,
which aligns with the equity premium puzzle. Asset price volatility is reinforced by
extrapolators’ sentiment and arbitrageurs’ noise information, which explain the excess
volatility puzzle. The model also proposes testable assumptions, providing a theoretical
foundation for several empirical asset pricing studies. The first assumption suggests that
low extrapolator sentiment predicts high asset returns. Results from Baker and Wurgler
(2006, 2007); Huang et al. (2015) corroborate this assumption. The second assumption
suggests that changes to institutional ownership predict asset returns positively, with
several empirical studies supporting this assumption (Asquith et al. (2005); Sias et al.
(2006)). The continuous-time model also helps investigate additional topics by varying
economic conditions and analyzing investors’ performance.
This study assesses the general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors
in non-competitive markets. The model covers most types of players in financial
markets—irrational and rational investors, informed and uninformed investors, passive
and active investors, and individual and institutional investors. The model generates
optimal trading strategies, corroborating several asset pricing characteristics. The model
also proposes hypotheses and provides a theoretical foundation for many empirical
asset pricing studies. In future research, the model should be extended to a multi-
asset model, and market data should be assessed to explore its profitability. For
example, researchers should analyze the predictive power of extrapolators’ sentiment
under varying institutional ownership markets and liquidity conditions. Fama–French
type empirical techniques should also be applied in this case.
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CHAPTER 2
CANMONOPOLISTIC TRADERS EXPLOIT IRRATIONAL TRADERS?
2.1 Introduction
Standard asset pricing theory focuses on competitive markets in which traders are price-
takers who optimize utility. The equilibrium price is thus established by the market
clearing condition, and such models assume perfect elasticity so orders of arbitrary size
do not affect asset prices. In non-competitive markets, traders influence asset prices and
therefore must consider the influence of their optimization strategies. Using a discrete-
time, general equilibrium model in a non-competitive market, this paper investigates
monopolistic traders’ optimal strategies with the coexistence of two realistic and typical
types of agents—arbitrageurs and extrapolators. Arbitrageurs trade on price deviations
from fundamental value, believing that deviations will be corrected in the future. In
traditional asset-pricing literature, they are treated as rational traders. Extrapolators
form beliefs about expected price changes based on weighted averages of past price
changes, a type of agent documented well in behavioral finance literature. Price impacts
cause additional costs because orders are executed only after prices have been adjusted
adversely. Although they must always trade on the adverse side, monopolistic traders
can use their market power to derive optimal strategies by making rational assumptions
and having full knowledge about other agents’ behaviors.
Some studies (Hong and Stein (1999); Barberis et al. (1998)) characterize extrapolators’
behaviors as overreactions to a sequence of good news. De Long et al. (1990a) propose an
overlapping generation model of noise traders whose irrational assumptions persist into
a subsequent period, creating additional risks for asset prices. Greenwood and Shleifer
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(2014) assess the extrapolation of stock market returns, finding that many investors
believe that stock prices will continue to rise after they have risen and continue to fall
after they have fallen. Choi and Mertens (2006) argue that extrapolators’ overreactions
to dividend news generate counter-cyclical expected returns that explain the equity
premium puzzle. Hirshleifer et al. (2015) show that extrapolative bias explains many
stylized facts about financial markets, such as high equity premiums, volatile stock
returns, and low and smooth risk-free rates. Barberis et al. (2015a) develop an equilibrium
model with interactions of fundamental traders and extrapolators, deriving extrapolators’
optimal strategies as a linear function of sentiment. The current paper applies this
context to model extrapolators whose optimal strategies are a linear function of sentiment,
adjusted for risk appetite, in which sentiment is defined as weighted averages of past
price changes. The model explains how heterogeneous agents interact and monopolistic
traders exploit extrapolators.
This study contributes to literature that examines large traders and price influences in
non-competitive markets. Extant studies commonly assume an exogenous price impact
function. Jarrow (1992) emphasizes the role of large traders during market manipulations,
providing examples of the price impact function. Frey and Stremme (1997) extend this
idea to a continuous-time model. Liu and Yong (2005) model the evolution of asset prices
according to a jump-diffusion process, in which price impact is characterized by the jump
component. Jonsson et al. (2004) assume that the price impact function is exponential,
and other studies, including Chevalier et al. (2013), Vath et al. (2007), Cvitanic´ et al. (1996),
Henderson and Hobson (2011), Rogers and Singh (2006), and Løkka (2014), assume that
price impacts take various exogenous forms. Different from these models, the current
equilibrium model has a price impact function that is endogenous, and consequently, it
accords with Jarrow (2016), who derived the first competitive market equilibrium asset
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pricing model with endogenous liquidity risk. The current model deviates from Jarrow
(2016) by deriving the price impact function from the market clearing condition, which
specifies the supply–demand relationship in the underlying economy. By incorporating
arbitrageurs’ and extrapolators’ optimal strategies, we obtain a relationship between
equilibrium price and monopolistic traders’ positions. This function resembles either a
supply or demand function because monopolistic traders’ positions influence both sides.
We then incorporate the knowledge of price impact function into monopolistic traders’
optimization problem to derive the equilibrium price. It is an equilibrium model because
each agent is optimal and the market clears, and the price impact function is embedded
in the general equilibrium model.
Literature on large traders usually specifies price impact as either temporary or
permanent. Bank and Baum (2004) assume temporary price changes, demonstrating the
absence of arbitrage for large traders. Cetin et al. (2004) and Jarrow and Protter (2005)
also assume temporary price changes while investigating arbitrage. Khemchandani et al.
(2013) and Bertsimas and Lo (1998) include a permanent component in their model.
We develop this idea by specifying price impact as a combination of temporary and
permanent components. The temporary component is arbitrageurs’ reactions to price
deviations and extrapolators’ sensitivities to current price change, and the permanent
component is extrapolators’ sentiment. The weight is shifted to investigate strategies
across economies.
Consistent with market microstructure literature, price impact represents liquidity
cost, in which magnitude indicates a market’s depth. Due to a need for immediacy,
investors’ orders are often larger than the quantity of shares available at the best market
quote. Hence, to achieve immediate execution, it is often necessary to dig into the limit
order book, which increases the price of each successive transaction. When the price
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impact is significant, searching for liquidity around the current price is difficult, and
traders must search for a more unfavorable quote in the limit order book. When the price
impact is negligible, there is abundant liquidity around the prevailing quote. Chevalier
et al. (2013) present a model accordingly, in which price impacts on the bid and ask prices
are modeled separately, and optimal market strategies are obtained. Jarrow (2016) and
Amihud (2002) assume liquidity risk is a pricing factor in multiple-factor models, and
we extend this idea by assuming that a portion of liquidity risk is manipulative, created
by the strategies of monopolistic traders. Therefore, liquidity risk is considerable only to
arbitrageurs and extrapolators, depending on their strategies.
This paper also contributes to asset pricing literature by deriving a general equilibrium
model that includes three heterogeneous agents. Traditional asset pricing models
commonly focus on one representative agent or two heterogeneous agents. Wang
(1993) introduces a rational expectation equilibrium model in which the asset price is
endogenous, deriving a linear relationship between the asset price and state variables.
Many studies follow this idea and obtain similar linear relationships in both continuous-
and discrete-time contexts. Models with more than two agents are usually too
complicated to obtain closed-form solutions. Detemple et al. (2014) derive a dynamic,
noisy, rational expectation model that includes informed and uninformed investors,
and active unskilled investors, but assume that unskilled investors have a functional
form similar to that of informed traders; they mimic informed traders’ strategies. In
the current model, traders’ strategies are disparate. De Long et al. (1990b) use a
three-period parsimonious model to show market manipulation strategies and bubble
creation with the coexistence of feedback and passive investors. They argue that these
strategies and their destabilizing effects have prevailed, for example, in the Dutch tulip
bulb market bubble and George Soros’ riding of conglomerates. However, in their
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model, feedback investors and passive investors are specified exogenously. In our
model, both extrapolators and arbitrageurs derive optimal strategies to maximize their
utility functions, and closed-form solutions of their strategies and equilibrium prices are
derived.
This study also contributes to market manipulation literature. Allen and Gale
(1992) divide manipulation into three categories—information-, action-, and trade-based.
During information-based manipulation, false information is released or rumors are
spread, and action-based manipulation resembles an activism strategy. These two types
of manipulation are monitored strictly by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
However, the third type of manipulation, trade-based, is difficult to eradicate. This type
of manipulation is defined as manipulating the market simply by buying and selling
without taking publicly observable actions to alter the value of a firm, or releasing
false information to change the price. Both Jarrow (1992) and De Long et al. (1990b)
provide examples of trade-based manipulation in a three-period model. The current
study demonstrates that with the existence of extrapolators, the endogenous price impact
function, and favorable market conditions, trade-based manipulation is profitable in a
multi-period economy, and monopolistic traders are able to manipulate price despite
always trading on the adverse side. The logic is intuitive. When monopolistic traders
place a buy order, which drives up asset prices, they expect an asset price to further
increase because extrapolators’ sentiments also increase. When monopolistic traders
place a sell order, the price might not decrease significantly if extrapolators’ sentiments
remain high. This study also relates to asset price bubbles. Barberis et al. (2015a) show
that bubbles can be generated by a sequence of good news. The current study shows that
bubbles can also be generated by purely trade-based manipulation with fundamental
shocks and investor sentiment. A reasonable conjecture is that the coexistence of a
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sequence of good news and trade-based manipulation has stimulated several significant
bubbles throughout history. Other strategies, such as optimal execution, can be
demonstrated similarly.
2.2 Model
We propose a discrete-time, heterogeneous-agent model in which some traders
extrapolate past price changes when forecasting future price changes, while other traders
are rational in the sense that they trade on price deviations from fundamental value. The
equilibrium asset price is determined by each trader’s optimal strategy and the market
clearing condition. We deviate from traditional literature by assuming monopolistic
traders have superior knowledge about other traders’ strategies. They are also aware
that their trades influence asset prices, and therefore take advantage by incorporating the
market clearing condition or price impact function into their optimal strategies.
2.2.1 Assets
We consider a discrete-time economy with infinite horizon t ∈ {0, 1, ...,∞}. We assume
complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈{0,1,...,∞},P) in which P is the statistical
probability measure. The economy consists of two assets—one riskless and one risky.
The riskless asset earns a constant return, which we normalize to zero. The risky asset,
which has a fixed supply of Q shares, has fundamental value
Prt = P
r
0 + 1 + 2 + ... + t
9
, where
i ∼ N(0, σ2 ), i.i.d.
Pr0 is the risky asset’s fundamental value at time 0. Innovation i is normally distributed
with a mean of zero and constant variance σ2 , where the variance is assumed greater than
zero. The ith innovation i becomes public information between time i − 1 and i. The risky
asset price at time t, Pt is determined implicitly by equilibrium.
2.2.2 Agents
We assume three types of agents in this economy—rational arbitrageurs, irrational
extrapolators, and monopolistic traders. The first two have identical utility functions but
different beliefs about the probability distributions of future asset prices; they represent
fundamental and technical investors. Monopolistic traders are smart and strategic in the
sense that they are aware of other agents’ preferences and beliefs.
Arbitrageurs
The first type of agent, arbitrageurs, believes that a current mispricing will be corrected
during the subsequent period, and consequently trade on the difference between current
market prices and expected fundamental values. During each period, arbitrageurs
maximize a CARA utility function defined over the subsequent period’s wealth:
max
Nat
Eat
[
−e−γ(Wat +Nat (P˜t+1−Pt))
]
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Wat is their wealth at time t, and Nat is arbitrageurs’ demand at time t. The utility
maximization problem gives the time t optimal strategy:
Nat =
Prt − Pt
γσ2
where Prt = P0 +
∑t
i=1 i is the fundamental price of a risky asset at time t. A proof appears
in Appendix A.1. Arbitrageurs are rational traders under traditional asset pricing theory,
but their rationality is bounded in the sense that they are myopic; they are unaware of
other agents’ strategies. Without mispricing, they are absent from the market, so the no-
trade theorem applies. With mispricing, they consider other players as noise traders who
trade for exogenous reasons. Arbitrageurs, who believe they don’t have market power,
act as price-takers.
Extrapolators
The second type of agent, extrapolators, is also myopic. They maximize a CARA utility
function defined over the subsequent period’s wealth:
max
Net
Eet
[
−e−γ(Wet +Net (P˜t+1−Pt))
]
Wet represents their wealth at time t, and Net is extrapolators’ demand at time t. However,
they are different from arbitrageurs because they form expectations about the subsequent
period’s price change according to past price changes. Their expected price change is:
Xet = Eet (P˜t+1 − Pt)
= (1 − θ)
t−1∑
k=1
θk−1(Pt−k − Pt−k−1) + θt−1Xe1 + θtXe0
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where Xet is the expected price change in extrapolators’ beliefs at time t. This relationship
also serves as a measure of investors’ sentiments in behavioral finance literature. We
henceforth denote Xet as sentiment. Xe0 and X
e
1 measure extrapolators’ initial sentiments.
Solving the utility maximization problem yields extrapolators’ optimal strategy:
Net =
Xet
γσ2
This specification indicates that extrapolators’ demand is linear in sentiment, which
accords with the continuous-time MAX-Capital Asset Pricing Model (MAX-CAPM). We
apply a similar context of extrapolators to Barberis et al. (2015a). The specification of
sentiment is similar to previous models of extrapolative beliefs (Cutler et al. (1990); Hong
and Stein (1999); Barberis and Shleifer (2003); Barberis et al. (2015b)). Some studies
also call extrapolators feedback traders (De Long et al. (1990b)). As with arbitrageurs,
extrapolators behave like price-takers.
Monopolistic Traders
Monopolistic traders maximize expected utility based on objectives. Examples include
large-order execution and market manipulation. In non-competitive market, with price
impact, monopolistic traders do not enjoy a current price before orders are placed. Their
orders are instead exercised after a price is influenced by orders, suffering from liquidity
cost. Cetin et al. (2004) and Bank and Baum (2004) consider the difference between paper
and liquidation values. We apply the same spirit to monopolistic traders’ problem. The
optimization problem at time t for monopolistic traders with trading horizon T − t + 1 is
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described as:
max
{Nmt ,...,NmT }
Emt
[
−e−γ[Wmt + f (Nmt ,Nmt+1,...,NmT )]|P0(Nm0 ), P1(Nm0 ,Nm1 ), ..., PT (Nm0 ,Nm1 , ...,NmT )
]
subject to
gi[Nm0 ,N
m
1 , ...,N
m
T |P0(Nm0 ), P1(Nm0 ,Nm1 ), ..., P(Nm0 ,Nm1 , ...,NmT )] = 0, i = 1, 2, ...,K
where Wmt is monopolistic traders’ deterministic initial wealth at the beginning of time t.
Nmt is their demand at time t. f (Nmt ,Nmt+1, ...,N
m
T ) is their objective, and gis are constraints
that reflect their self-financing trading strategies with initial wealth.
Monopolistic traders are funds and institutional investors who commonly experience
various time constraints. Funding liquidity risk is paramount, but problems force them
to pay much attention to period reports. Consequently, we assume monopolistic traders
have a finite horizon. Although they operate in an infinite horizon economy, they enter
the market at time t with a certain initial wealth, and they accomplish their objectives and
exit the market at time T . Typical monopolistic traders’ problems are discussed below.
Example 1: Optimal Liquidation Strategies
Suppose a broker holds a positive initial position of risky asset, and he or she wants to
close this position within a trading window of T periods. The objective is to maximize
liquidation value, or minimize the difference between paper and liquidation value. The
problem is:
max
{Nmk }(t≤k≤T )
Emt
[
−e−γ[Nmt−1(Pt−1+t)+(∑Tk=t Pk(Nmk−1−Nmk ))]]
subject to
0 = Nmt−1 − m
0 = NmT
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Example 2: Optimal Buying Strategies
Suppose a broker starts with initial funds Wmt . He or she uses a sequence of buy orders
to enter the market, aiming to optimize paper wealth at time T . The buy order drives
up asset prices, and the order is executed after price change. Therefore, the broker
experiences a paradox. If he or she executes a large block order, the asset becomes very
expensive, but if a sequence of small orders is executed, both more fundamental shocks
and time constraints are experienced. The problem is:
max
{Nmk }(t≤k≤T )
Emt
[
−e−γ(Wmt +PTNmT )
]
subject to
0 =
T∑
k=t
Pt(Nmt − Nmt−1) −Wmt
0 = Nmt−1
Example 3: Market Manipulation Strategies
Suppose a market manipulator has market power, and he or she applies trade-based
strategies to maximize cash wealth. These strategies include pump-and-dump and bear
raid. The problem is:
max
{Nmk }(t≤k≤T )
Emt
[
−e−γ[(∑Tk=t Pk(Nmk−1−Nmk ))]]
subject to
0 = Nmt−1
0 = NmT
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2.2.3 Market Clearing
Assuming the portion of arbitrageurs, extrapolators, and monopolistic traders are µa, µe,
and µm = 1 − µa − µe, respectively, the market clearing condition is:
µaNat + µ
eNet + µ
mNmt = Q
In non-competitive financial markets with large traders and market power, a price
impact function is assumed, a demand and/or supply function that indicates the
relationship between large traders’ positions and market prices. In our equilibrium
model, the market clearing condition serves as the endogenous price impact function,
which is known by only monopolistic traders who take advantage of the knowledge.
Plugging in arbitrageurs’ and extrapolators’ optimal strategies yields a clearer
supply–demand relationship:
Pt = Prt −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
Xet +
µmγσ2
µa
Nmt
in which extrapolators’ sentiments have a recursive dynamic:
Xet =

(1 − θ)(Pt−1 − Pt−2) + θXt−1 t > 1
Xet t = 0, 1
When writing recursively, extrapolators’ sentiments consist of two components - the
previous sentiment and the most recent price changes. θ measures the relative weight.
When θ is low, sentiment is determined primarily by the most recent price changes, and
when high, even price changes in the distant past affect a current sentiment. Absent
fundamental value shocks, the sentiment decays exponentially by proportion θ. A lemma
gives a closed-form representation of extrapolators’ sentiments in terms of monopolistic
traders’ strategies and exogenous fundamental shocks.
15
Lemma 1 Extrapolators’ sentiments at time t are determined endogenously by their initial
sentiments, the realized fundamental value shocks before time t, and monopolistic traders’
sequences of trades before time t, expressed as:
Xek =
ak − bk
a − b X
e
1 − ab
ak−1 − bk−1
a − b X
e
0
+ (1 − θ)η
k−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b (N
m
k−i − Nmk−i−1)
+ (1 − θ)
k−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b k−i
(2.1)
where η = µ
mγσ2
µa
. a and b are roots of a second-order polynomial that is specified in Appendix A.2.
The lemma suggests that monopolistic traders can use their sequences of trades to
manipulate extrapolators’ sentiments. Two factors determine the significance of influence
on sentiments—the magnitude of a trade and the time when the trade occurs. Applying
the lemma gives a closed-form representation of asset price.
Proposition 1 The asset price, or the price impact function, is a function of monopolistic traders’
sequences of trades:
Pt = Prt −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
[
at − bt
a − b X
e
1 − ab
at−1 − bt−1
a − b X
e
0
]
+ (1 − θ)ηµ
e
µa
t−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b (N
m
t−i − Nmt−i−1) + ηNmt
+ (1 − θ)µ
e
µa
t−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b t−i
(2.2)
where η = µ
mγσ2
µa
. a and b are roots of a second-order polynomial that is specified in Appendix A.2.
The market clearing condition gives a supply–demand relationship. The asset price
is determined by total supply Q and agents’ total demands, which are themselves
16
determined by the asset price. Arbitrageurs trade on the difference between the current
price and fundamental value, and extrapolators trade on their sentiments. Besides the
exogenous shocks, both incentives can be influenced by monopolistic traders’ sequences
of trades, and consequently, the asset price is also determined by the joint effect of
exogenous shocks and monopolistic traders’ trading histories. The further away trades
or shocks occurred, the less influence they have on the current price. The price impact
function is unknown by either arbitrageurs or extrapolators since they do not have market
power and act as price-takers. However, monopolistic traders are knowledgeable, aware
of this relationship, and consider it during their optimization problem. We next define
monopolistic traders–arbitrageurs–extrapolators (MAX) equilibrium.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
In the economy described above, MAX equilibrium is defined as price process {Pt}t≥0 and
trading strategies (Nat ,Net ,Nmt ) such that:
1. The trading strategies solve each agent’s optimization problem at each time t.
2. The market clears such that supply equals demand or asset price process {Pt}t≥0 is as
described in Proposition 1.
Arbitrageurs and extrapolators are myopic since their utility functions are defined
only over the next period’s wealth. Contrarily, monopolistic traders’ utility functions
are defined over their objectives, which are over the entire trading horizon. To achieve
equilibrium at each time t, they must incorporate realized information and solve the
optimization problem continuously. For example, at time t, monopolistic traders form
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trading plan {Nmt , ...,NmT }t for trading horizon {t, t+1, ...,T }. They hold (Nmt )t of risky asset at
time t according to the trading plan. At time t+1, public information t+1 becomes available
and is observed by all traders. At this point, monopolistic traders do not necessarily
follow the time t plan and hold (Nmt+1)t of the risky asset. They instead construct updated
trading plan {Nmt+1, ...,NmT }t+1 for trading horizon {t+1, t+2, ...,T }. They then hold (Nmt+1)t+1 of
the risky asset accordingly. They incorporate updated information when creating trading
strategies at time t + 1 such that the trading horizon decreases by one, the asset price at
the beginning becomes Pt + t+1, and extrapolators’ sentiments become Xet .
Most finance literature that examines non-competitive markets treats the price impact
function as exogenous, though the degree is determined endogenously; the more shares
purchased, the more impact on the asset price. In our model, the price impact function is
embedded in the equilibrium condition. Since monopolistic traders’ strategies ensure the
market clearing condition, their optimization problem leads directly to MAX equilibrium.
2.3 Optimal Execution
The optimal execution problem has many market applications, particularly when an
investor must buy or liquidate asset positions within a fixed horizon. Suppose a hedge
fund must cover a short position at time T . The task is thus to buy, for example, one
percent of total market shares before the due date. Due to liquidity constraints, it might
be costly to place the entire order at the same time. The hedge fund can instead consider
forming an optimal buying strategy and spread the orders over the trading horizon. In
a similar example, a broker wants to liquidate some large block orders to minimize a
client’s costs.
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Many studies assess price impact, and most assume a large trader and exogenous price
impacts (Frey and Stremme (1997); Cetin et al. (2004); Bank and Baum (2004); Rogers and
Singh (2006)). MAX equilibrium applies a different approach. No exogenous price impact
function is assumed, and exogenous fundamental value shocks can be zero or go either
way.
2.3.1 MAX Equilibrium for Optimal Liquidation Strategy
In this section, the optimal liquidation strategy is used as an example. Monopolistic
traders are treated as brokers who hold a positive initial position in a risky asset at time
0, aiming to close the position within a trading window of T periods. The trader wants
to minimize the difference between the initial paper and final liquidation value. Since
selling large volumes aggressively saves time but substantially reduces the asset price,
the trader must find a trade-off between a large block order and a sequence of small
orders. The broker has superior knowledge about other traders’ strategies, of which they
can take advantage.
Monopolistic traders’ optimal liquidation strategy at time 1 is:
max
{Nmk }(1≤k≤T )
Em1
[
−e−γ[Nm0 (Pr0+1)+(∑Tk=1 Pk(Nmk−1−Nmk ))]]
subject to
0 = Nm0 − m
0 = NmT
Proposition 2 Given information available at time 1, under MAX equilibrium, monopolistic
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traders’ optimal trading strategy Nm
1
= {Nm1 , ...,NmT }1 at time 1 is:
Nm
1
= A−1
1
b1 (2.3)
where A1 is (T − 1) × (T − 1) matrix:
A1 =

a11 a12 a13 . . . a1(T−1)
a21 a22 a23 . . . a2(T−1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
a(T−1)1 a(T−1)2 a(T−1)3 . . . a(T−1)(T−1)

and b1 is (T − 1) × 1 vector:
b1 =

b1
b2
...
bT−1

Expressions of A1 and b1 appear in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 provides monopolistic traders’ optimal liquidation strategy at time 1
based on the information available. This problem concerns convex optimization. The
following corollary states the sufficient condition for the existence of MAX equilibrium:
Corollary 1 Monopolistic traders’ optimal liquidation strategy and MAX equilibrium exist if the
diagonal elements in A1 are non-positive.
Expressions of the diagonal elements in A1 appear in Appendix A.2, and a proof is in
Appendix A.2.
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2.3.2 Numerical Example
To illustrate the results in proposition 2, we consider three numerical examples in which
trading horizon T equals 3, 4, and 5, respectively. We follow values of the continuous-time
MAX-CAPM paper and assume that risk aversion γ is 0.1, fundamental shock volatility
σ is 0.25, and total supply of the risky asset Q is 5. We assume that there are no realized
fundamental shocks, so the time 1 trading plan equals the realized trading plan. We
also assume that extrapolators’ initial sentiments are zero. Monopolistic traders’ initial
position Nm0 is 3 and their market share is 40%. They therefore must liquidate 24% of
the total share of the risky asset. Market shares of the arbitrageurs and extrapolators are
set to 30%. θ equals 0.75, so the current price change contributes to 25% of the current
sentiment.
Figure A.1 shows the trading plan and equilibrium price in each case. Across a longer
trading horizon, monopolistic traders sell more slowly, and therefore the liquidation
cost, defined as the difference between the initial paper and terminal liquidation value,
decreases as the trading horizon increases. Selling reduces the asset price, which recovers
gradually after monopolistic traders exit the market. Figure A.2 shows the trading plan
and equilibrium price when θ is 0.25, so the current price change contributes to 75% of
the current sentiment. Extrapolators are particularly sensitive to the current price change,
and in this case, monopolistic traders sell more aggressively. For example, in the three-
period model, they sell 80% of their shares at time 1 in comparison to 67% in the previous
case. The liquidation cost increases in all three cases, which demonstrates that this market
is less favorable to monopolistic traders. The asset price plunges more substantially in
comparison to the previous case, but then recovers rapidly.
In most cases, monopolistic traders sell less aggressively across a longer trading
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horizon. However, one unexpected observation, shown in panel (c) of figure A.2, was
that monopolistic traders placed one block order and sold 93% of their shares at time
1. As the asset price plunged, the arbitrageurs traded to correct the mispricing. The
asset price then recovered rapidly from time 2. Extrapolators’ sentiment also recovered.
With superior knowledge about other traders’ strategies, the monopolistic traders took
advantage of the price recovery. They placed a large buy order at time 3, followed by
a sell order at time 4 to clear their position. The last two trades generated extra profit
and reduced the liquidation cost. In comparison to the high θ case, the liquidation cost
increased by only 0.0033 during the five-period model, in contrast to 0.0095 during the
three-period model and 0.0117 during the four-period model.
Figure A.3 shows the trading plan and equilibrium price in a scenario of an initial
fundamental shock. We reset θ to 0.75. In response to a negative fundamental shock, the
asset price plunged rapidly. Monopolistic traders reacted by placing a large block order
at time 1. However, they still incurred a tremendous liquidation cost. In another scenario
and in response to a positive fundamental shock, monopolistic traders sold more slowly.
They sold 37% of their shares at time 1 in response to a positive fundamental shock,
in comparison to 87% in response to a negative fundamental shock. The liquidation
cost reduced by 50%. Therefore, the prime timing for liquidation was immediately after
positive news.
Figure A.4 panel (a) shows the trading plan and equilibrium price when the initial
sentiment was negative. The negative initial sentiment drove the asset price below the
fundamental value. Arbitrageurs were expected to correct the mispricing, which led to an
upward price trend. The positive price change increased extrapolators’ demand, which
further increased the asset price. In this scenario, monopolistic traders waited one period
until a price trend was created. From time 2, they were able to hide their sell orders;
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they liquidatedwithout moving the asset price in an unfavorable direction. Finally, their
liquidation value exceeded the initial paper value, which was due to the increased asset
price. Hence, monopolistic traders were able to both liquidate their position and gain
positive profit.
Figure A.4 panel (c) shows the trading plan and equilibrium price when the initial
sentiment was positive. The asset price was expected to decrease over the trading
horizon. Monopolistic traders’ best strategy was to sell the entire position immediately.
They also short sold to mitigate their losses. However, in the optimal trading strategy,
they still incurred a huge liquidation cost.
Our model considers the optimal execution strategy under various market conditions.
A favorable market condition includes a positive initial fundamental shock and negative
initial sentiment. Extrapolators’ attributes also played a role in the strategy.
2.4 Market Manipulation
In this section, monopolistic traders are treated like market manipulators, with trade-
based manipulations possible. A typical manipulation strategy is pump-and-dump,
during which an upward price trend is created and then traded against. Other strategies
include the bear raid and short squeeze. Jarrow (1992) provides a sufficient condition
in the asset price process, which excludes market manipulation trading strategies—the
asset price process depends only on manipulators’ aggregated holdings, not the sequence
of trades that attained it. This sufficient condition is violated by the coexistence of
manipulators, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators, and consequently, market manipulation is
possible in the economy. However, manipulators must face the paradox of manipulation.
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They can use their market power to manipulate asset prices in their favor, but their orders
are exercised only after prices have adjusted, so they must always trade on the adverse
side. The second point means that when they place an order and the price changes, they
enjoy only the changed price. Whether they are able to profit is questionable, depending
on the economy.
2.4.1 MAX Equilibrium for Market Manipulation Strategy
During trade-based market manipulation, information is available to all traders.
Monopolistic traders hold zero shares of a risky asset at time 0. They apply the optimal
trading strategy to maximize their real wealth, defined as the total amount of cash
collected over the trading horizon. They exit the market at time T , when their position
of the risky asset returns to zero. Monopolistic traders’ optimal market manipulation
strategy at time 1 is:
max
{Nmk }(1≤k≤T )
Em1
[
−e−γ[(∑Tk=1 Pk(Nmk−1−Nmk ))]]
subject to
0 = Nm0
0 = NmT
Proposition 3 Given information available at time 1, under MAX equilibrium, market
manipulators’ optimal trading strategy Nm
1
= {Nm1 , ...,NmT }1 at time 1 is:
Nm
1
= X−1
1
y1 (2.4)
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where X1 is (T − 1) × (T − 1) matrix:
X1 =

x11 x12 x13 . . . x1(T−1)
x21 x22 x23 . . . x2(T−1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
x(T−1)1 x(T−1)2 x(T−1)3 . . . x(T−1)(T−1)

and y1 is (T − 1) × 1 vector:
y1 =

y1
y2
...
yT−1

Expressions of X1 and y1 appear in Appendix A.2, and a proof appears in Appendix A.2.
A corollary provides the sufficient condition to ensure MAX equilibrium in the
economy.
Corollary 2 Monopolistic traders’ optimal market manipulation strategy and MAX equilibrium
exist if the diagonal elements in X1 are non-positive.
A question is raised of whether pure trade-based manipulation is profitable in a plain
economy without a fundamental shock and with zero initial sentiment. A corollary
addresses this question.
Corollary 3 In a plain economy without a fundamental shock and with zero initial sentiment, no
market manipulation strategy is profitable. A manipulator’s optimal strategy is not to trade.
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In a plain economy, monopolistic traders’ optimal strategy is to hold zero shares of
the asset. Extrapolators hold zero shares of the asset because the sentiment is zero. The
market is efficient because the equilibrium price reflects the fundamental value, which
excludes arbitrageurs’ activity from the market. Hence, no trade theorem applies.
2.4.2 Numerical Example
However, market manipulation is profitable when an exogenous disturbance drives the
market value away from the fundamental value. In this case, the optimal strategy and
the ability to profit varies according to market conditions. To illustrate the results of
proposition 3, we provide examples in which trading horizon T equals 3, 4, and 5. In line
with the previous section, we assume risk aversion γ is 0.1, fundamental shock volatility
σ is 0.25, and total supply of the risky asset Q is 5. Market shares of monopolistic traders,
arbitrageurs, and extrapolators are set at 40%, 30%, and 30%, respectively. We assume no
realized fundamental shocks after time 1, so the time 1 trading plan is the realized trading
plan.
Figure A.5 shows the trading plans and equilibrium prices across trading horizons
when there is a positive initial fundamental shock. θ is set to 0.75, so 75% of the previous
sentiment is inherited and the current price change contributes to 25% of the current
sentiment. In each case, monopolistic traders follow a pump-and-dump strategy to create
a positive price trend and trade against it. Hence, a positive asset price bubble is created.
Monopolistic traders’ profit increases by 20% when the trading horizon increases from
3 to 5 periods. When the trading horizon is sufficiently long, monopolistic traders take
advantage of the downward price trend and sell short during the last period to make
extra profit.
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We examine the case in which extrapolators pay more attention to the current price
change. Results are shown in figure A.6. θ is set to 0.5, so the current price change
contributes to 50% of the current sentiment. A larger asset price bubble is created, which
is 20% greater than the fundamental value, in comparison to 10% in the previous case.
The optimal market manipulation strategy is still pump-and-dump, but manipulators are
able to generate much larger profit, as much as 5 − 6 times greater than in the previous
case. Manipulators prefer sensitive extrapolators and high market volatility.
In this example, the larger bubble is accompanied by a higher trading volume. The
trading volume is nearly three times higher than the trading volume in the previous
case. That bubbles feature high trading volumes is pointed out in finance literature
Ofek and Richardson (2003); Carlos et al. (2006); Hong and Stein (2007). Our model
explains this feature. Figure A.7 shows the trading plans and equilibrium prices across
trading horizons when there is a negative initial fundamental shock. Without short-sell
constraints, the bear raid strategy is stimulated, and a negative price bubble is created.
Initially, the market crashes, which is followed by a slow recovery. However, since
monopolistic traders are able to sell short, their profitability is not weakened by the
negative shock.
Figure A.8 shows the trading plans and equilibrium prices under various initial
sentiments. We assume that sentiment at time 0 is negative. Figure A.8 panel (a)
shows that the sentiment at time 1 decreases and deviates further from zero. Absent
monopolistic traders, decreasing sentiment creates a downward price trend, followed by
an upward trend as the negative sentiment gradually diminishes and arbitrageurs correct
the mispricing. Monopolistic traders react by placing a buy order at time 1 to slightly
support the price. They do not push the price to the fundamental level because they want
to take advantage of the subsequent upward trend and thereby exit the market secretly.
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In this case, they trade aggressively and gain a large profit.
Shown in figure A.8 panel (b), we assume that at time 1, sentiment does not change
from time 0. A flat yet upward price trend is created. Monopolistic traders’ strategy is
similar to the case shown in panel (a), but they trade less aggressively, which generates
less trading volume. Hence, profit is only one-third of that shown in panel (a). In panel
(c), we assume that at time 1, sentiment becomes slightly positive. Monopolistic traders’
demand and profit decrease significantly. When sentiments swing widely, they offset
each other, which decreases monopolistic traders’ profit. When no extrapolators are in the
market, no market manipulation strategy is profitable. In this case, monopolistic traders’
optimal strategy is not to trade. Therefore, they cannot exploit rational arbitrageurs,
and they profit only in the presence of extrapolators, whose sentiment reacts to the price
impact.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the equilibrium price of a financial market using three typical types
of agents—monopolistic traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators. The equilibrium price
is determined by two factors. The first is the current market condition, which includes,
for example, asset fundamental risk, aggregated supply, risk aversion, and extrapolators’
attitudes toward past price changes. The second is monopolistic traders’ past sequences
of trades. The equilibrium asset price is determined by not only monopolistic traders’
current holdings, but trading history. Results have implications for institutional investors
who have a strong research ability and are therefore aware of the behaviors of other types
of agents in the market. They are also aware that their trades influence the market price.
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Considering their objectives, our model helps them construct optimal strategies.
For example, a broker has a large initial position and wants to liquidate it after T
periods. When the broker starts to sell, he or she considers whether arbitrageurs will
correct the price over time. He or she must also consider whether extrapolators will sell,
which might amplify the downside price movement. Using our model, the broker is
able to decide whether to liquidate the position using a large block order or hide the sell
order in a sequence of small trades to maximize the liquidation value. Another example
is market manipulation, which continues to be popular especially in emerging markets.
In China’s A-share market, over 60% of investors are retail investors who lack basic
financial knowledge, so they are manipulated easily. Their behaviors resemble that of
extrapolators in our model. A typical market manipulation strategy is pump-and-dump.
When manipulators begin to exit the market, they must ensure that extrapolators will
think the price is still rising, so they take over sell orders. Our model helps monopolistic
traders create market manipulation strategies. We demonstrate that a purely trade-based
market manipulation strategy is unprofitable in the absence of fundamental shocks and
extrapolator sentiment.
We assume that the fundamental price of a risky asset is affected only by i.i.d shocks. A
natural extension of this model is to add complicated structures to the asset’s fundamental
price. One determinant might be the asset’s fundamental risk, and another the market’s
risk-bearing capacity. Structures should be added to the arbitrageurs’ strategies. For
example, in addition to market liquidity risk, arbitrageurs also face funding liquidity
risk and short-sale constraints. In this case, they trade less aggressively when there is a
large price bubble. Short-sale constraints cause a bubble to expand (Xiong and Yu (2011)),
which strengthens monopolistic traders’ pump-and-dump strategy.
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In the real world, multiple strategic, rational, monopolistic traders coexist in the
market. Profitability depends not only on their rationality, but the ability to study
other traders’ strategies. A trader who knows his or her competitors profits most.
To corroborate this theory, another type of monopolistic trader should be considered,
one aware of arbitrageurs and extrapolators but is unaware of the existence of other
monopolistic traders. The profitability of both types of monopolistic traders should be
studied in future research. The model is based on a single risky asset. In the real world,
thousands of assets correlate, and optimal trading strategies are commonly based on
dependency between assets. The model should be extended to a multi-asset model in
which empirical data generate trading strategies to corroborate the model. Parameters
should be calibrated to represent current market conditions. Econometric models could
also be used to assess optimal trading window T . Although this model is designed
for application to median-frequency trading, traders can also apply it to high-frequency
trading contexts.
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CHAPTER 3
THEMONOPOLISTIC TRADERS, ARBITRAGEURS, AND EXTRAPOLATORS
CAPITAL ASSET PRICINGMODEL
3.1 Introduction
A primary research focus in finance is assessing determinants of cross-sectional and time-
series properties of asset prices. Since Breeden (1979), consumption asset pricing models
have been introduced that use marginal rates of substitution to determine the stochastic
discount factor of risky asset prices. However, empirical tests on the original model are
largely negative. Cochrane (2009) argues that contemporary theoretical research into
the behaviors of aggregated risky asset prices have simultaneously incorporated four
empirical facts. First, Mehra and Prescott (1985) find the equity premium puzzle, and
Mehra (2003) shows that the average post-war real return on the S&P500 index is 8.4%
per year, while the less risky security return is 0.6% per year, which leads to very large
equity premiums − of about 7.8% returns annually. This requires an unreasonably large
risk-aversion parameter in the original model. Second, LeRoy and Porter (1981); Shiller
(1981) identify the excess volatility puzzle. Stock returns are very volatile, with a standard
deviation of 17% per year1. Third, post-war household data suggest that risk-free rates are
persistent. Fourth, dividend price ratios are excellent predictors of the percentage of long-
term stock returns (Fama and French (1988); Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b)). Although
earlier research (Campbell and Shiller (1988a); Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983)) uses
time-varying discount rates to explain these puzzles, later research emphasizes time-
varying risk-aversion. The most popular models are the habit formation (Campbell and
1Gilchrist (2013): lecture notes from Boston University
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Cochrane (1999)) and long-run risk models (Bansal and Yaron (2004)).
The original model applies several assumptions. First, all investors are rational and
have identical probability beliefs for states of the world. Second, markets are competitive
and frictionless, and agents act as price-takers. In the real world, investors incorporate
disparate market strategies, and not all strategies are rational, or they are only rational
under some subjective probability measures. According to Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014), evidence supports extrapolation of the expectations of stock market prices, and
despite fundamental values, extrapolative investors expect future stock prices to increase
or decrease after increases or decreases to past prices. Arbitrageurs are also not always
able to correct mispricing, though their trades move prices closer to fundamental values.
They dampen irrational price movements but do not commonly eliminate them. For
example, they are subject to market liquidity risk, funding liquidity risk, and information
noise. Institutional investors are common in financial markets. According to the New
York Stock Exchange Factbook, institutional investors increased their market shares from
4.3% in 1950 to 42.9% in 2010. Most institutional investors build knowledgeable and
experienced research teams to explore competitors’ strategies, and they are aware that
their trades influence market prices. They are no longer price takers but monopolistic
traders who have market power in non-competitive markets.
This paper extends the consumption-based asset pricing model by relaxing the
identical rational agents and competitive market assumptions. Using a monopolistic
traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators capital asset pricing model (MAX-CAPM),
we investigate general equilibrium asset prices in non-competitive markets with
heterogeneous agents. The model was developed in a continuous-time framework with
standard constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility and an identical risk aversion
parameter across agents. General equilibrium risky asset prices are obtained in closed
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form by applying a dynamic programming technique and solving high-order partial
differential equations (PDEs). Parameters of the PDEs are calculated by solving a system
of polynomials, and in this way, each agent’s optimal investment strategy is determined.
The existence and behaviors of extrapolators have been investigated by several
researchers. Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998) incorporate extrapolators
in their models, and De Long et al. (1990a) propose an overlapping generation model
with irrational noise traders whose incorrect beliefs persist during subsequent periods,
creating additional risk. Similar to the heterogeneous-agent context in this paper, De Long
et al. (1990b) introduce a model with positive feedback traders, passive investors, and
informed rational speculators. Their discrete time, three-period model suggests that
market power creates bubbles, generating positive returns. Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014) survey expectations of stock market returns, finding that many investors believe
that stock prices continue to increase after having previously increased, and decrease after
having previously decreased. Barberis et al. (2015b) present a consumption capital asset
pricing model that includes interactions between rational traders and extrapolators, in
which sentiment is a state variable. Choi and Mertens (2006) argue that extrapolators’
overreactions to dividend news generate counter-cyclical expected returns that explain
the equity premium puzzle. Hirshleifer et al. (2015) also use extrapolative bias to explain
stylized facts about financial markets, such as high equity premiums, volatile stock
returns, and low risk-free rates.
This paper models extrapolators in a way similar to Barberis et al. (2015b). Investors
form probability beliefs about future asset prices based on sentiment, determined by
historical asset prices instead of asset characteristics, and the influence of historical asset
prices decays. For example, if asset prices have been increasing for several months,
extrapolators expect an asset price to continue increasing during the subsequent month.
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If a significant price increase occurs, extrapolators expect the asset price to increase
significantly in the near future, and they optimize their strategies accordingly. In our
model, extrapolators’ incorrect beliefs also create incorrect perceptions of arbitrageurs’
behaviors, which has an amplified effect on their decisions.
The constraints arbitrageurs experience are documented well in finance literature.
De Long et al. (1990a) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) model such constraints using a
context in which irrational investors are optimistic and pessimistic. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) show that across short horizons, arbitrageurs lose money when pessimism persists,
especially when they experience agency problems. De Long et al. (1990b) argue that
risk aversion prevents arbitrageurs from correcting mispricing over time, and Xiong
and Yu (2011) find that short-sell constraints create abnormal price movements and
bubbles. Other constraints include market liquidity, funding liquidity, and information.
Wang (1993) discusses the information precision effects of asset prices, and market
microstructure literature uses information, inventory, and liquidity to explain constraints
during price formation. Our model follows these studies, but its innovation is
that it includes the endogenous equilibrium asset prices while maintaining the limits
of arbitrage. Arbitrageurs’ investment strategies are modeled using mean-reverting
drift diffusion based on mispricing, in which mispricing is the difference between
fundamental and equilibrium asset prices. Fundamental asset prices are obtained by
solving a general equilibrium model with only rational investors, and equilibrium asset
prices are calculated endogenously using the underlying general equilibrium problem.
Convergence serves as the liquidity indicator, and diffusion a measure of information
precision.
This paper relates to research on large traders and price impacts in non-competitive
markets. However, extant literature commonly assumes an exogenous price impact
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function. For example, Jarrow (1992) studies the role of large traders during market
manipulation by specifying a convex price impact function. Frey and Stremme (1997)
extend the idea to a continuous time model, and Cetin et al. (2004) assume a stochastic
supply curve for a security price as a function of trade size. Liu and Yong (2005) model
the evolution of asset prices as a jump-diffusion process, during which the price impact
is characterized in the exogenous jump component. Jonsson et al. (2004) assume that
the price impact function takes an exogenous exponential form. Other papers, including
Chevalier et al. (2013), Vath et al. (2007), Cvitanic´ et al. (1996), Henderson and Hobson
(2011), Rogers and Singh (2006), and Løkka (2014), assume that the price impact takes
various exogenous forms.
In contrast, one contribution of the current study is the introduction of monopolistic
traders and an endogenous price impact function. This paper and Jarrow (2016) are first
to endogenize the price impact function in the equilibrium asset pricing model. In this
paper, the price impact function describes the supply–demand relationship of an asset;
when supply or demand changes, the equilibrium asset price also changes. Therefore,
the market clearing condition in the general equilibrium model serves as a price impact
function, and the equilibrium price is determined endogenously by equating supply and
demand. The competitive market assumption is thus relaxed by having monopolistic
traders incorporate the market clearing condition during their optimization problem. A
rational expectation equilibrium is obtained because each agent is able to guess the correct
functional form of the equilibrium price and then verify this initial guess after solving the
model.
We build the MAX-CAPM in a continuous-time environment. The portfolio selection
problem using continuous-time model is introduced by Merton (1971). In this model, a
dynamic programming technique and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations are
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applied to obtain PDEs that characterize the behaviors of each agent’s value function.
Parameters of the PDEs are calculated by solving a system of fifteen polynomials, among
which six are derived from extrapolators’ optimization problem, six from monopolistic
traders’ optimization problem, and three from the market clearing condition. The
solution to the system of polynomials describes the solution to the model completely.
Heterogeneous agents and a non-competitive market context simultaneously
reproduce many characteristics in empirical asset pricing data. Market power enables
monopolistic traders to require higher expected returns, which justifies the equity
premium puzzle. Expected returns increase alongside the current bearishness of
sentiment, the limits of arbitrage, and the market shares of monopolistic traders.
Extrapolators’ wealth diminishes, and they are continuously replaced by the next
generation of extrapolators. The volatility of asset prices increases when extrapolators are
more sensitive to current price changes, or when arbitrageurs’ information is less precise.
This result explains the excess volatility puzzle. The risk-free rate is set endogenously
by the central bank at the beginning to maximize initial consumption, and is persistent
thereafter. The expected return is determined by the relative dividend and equilibrium
prices, which aligns with the predictive power of the dividend price ratio.
The continuous-time model suggests several hypotheses that provide theoretical
foundations for empirical asset pricing research. The first assumption is that low
sentiment predicts high asset returns, and results from Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007);
Huang et al. (2015) corroborate the assumption. The second assumption is that changes
to institutional ownership predict asset returns positively, with several studies, including
Jones et al. (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Bennett et al. (2003),
and Parrino et al. (2003), supporting the assumption. By introducing a method of
generating higher frequency covariances, Sias et al. (2006) investigate the source of
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this predictive power and provide two explanations. First, institutional investors are
better informed and hold correct beliefs about the distribution of future asset prices.
Second, institutional investors’ trades have direct effects on asset prices through the
supply–demand relationship. We assume that monopolistic traders hold correct beliefs
about risky asset prices and the market clearing condition. We show that increases to
monopolistic traders’ market shares increase expected returns. Both assumptions and
results corroborate results from Sias et al. (2006). Other assumptions concern time-series
momentum, market liquidity, and information precision. The continuous-time model
can also be used to investigate additional topics by varying economic conditions and
analyzing investors’ performance.
3.2 The Benchmark Model
We introduce a homogeneous agent rational expectation model, which serves as a
benchmark and provides fundamental values of a risky and riskless asset. Risky asset
prices and returns are determined by a rational expectation equilibrium, and the risk-
free rate is set endogenously by the central bank at the beginning to maximize initial
consumption, and is persistent thereafter. The context of rational agents is the same
as that in the traditional asset pricing model. Since a random component exists, the
asset price may deviate from the fundamental value. Rational agents’ trading strategies
serve as a correction mechanism, which guarantees that the price does not deviate
after incorporating rational agents’ preferences. A heterogeneous-agent model is then
introduced with a natural assumption that the fundamental values of the risky and
riskless assets enter agents’ decision-making; each agent forms an optimal strategy that
depends on results from the benchmark model, which is also helpful while analyzing
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comparative statics.
3.2.1 The Setup
Consider a continuous-time, infinite-horizon economy in which uncertainty is
represented by complete probability space (Ω,F,P) and information filtration (Ft)t≥0, for
which Ft is the information set observed up to time t by rational agents. The economy
includes two assets. A risky asset has a fixed supply of Q shares, and its equilibrium
price at time t is denoted Prt . The risky asset generates an instantaneous dividend of Dt,
which is governed by diffusion process
dDt = gDdt + σDdZDt
, where gD is the deterministic dividend growth rate and σD the volatility. We assume
that they are both positive and constant. dZDt is a Brownian motion that characterizes
the randomness of the dividend process. The riskless asset has constant rate of return r
(r ≥ 0). This risk-free rate is set by the central bank at time 0 to maximize the consumption
(i.e., utility) at that time. Knowing the dividend process, rational agents choose optimal
consumption and investment strategies to maximize the expected utility at time 0 as
Er0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
r
t
γ
dt

subject to
dWrt = (rW
r
t −Crt )dt + Nrt [(Dt − rPrt )dt + dPrt ]
for which γ is the risk aversion parameter and δ the time discount factor. Being fully
informed in an economy, rational agents correctly conjecture probability beliefs for future
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dividends. The optimal strategy is determined by asset prices and dividends, and the
risky asset price is determined endogenously by rational agents’ strategies and market
clearing conditions.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Rational expectation equilibrium is defined as consumption and investment strategy
(Crt ,N
r
t ) and price process Prt , such that:
1. Each agent chooses the consumption and investment strategy to maximize his or
her expected utility.
2. The price clears the security market (i.e., Nrt = Q).
Proposition 4 In an economy with homogeneous rational agents, equilibrium risky asset prices
are
Prt = p
r
0 +
Dt
r
where
pr0 =
gD − γQσ2D
r2
The optimal consumption and investment strategy is
Crt = rW
r
t −
r − δ
rγ
+
γσ2DQ
2
2r
Nrt = Q
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3.2.3 Discussion
Solving rational agents’ optimization problem generates a demand curve. Changes to
the dividend growth rate instigate a parallel shift in the demand curve, and changes to
risk aversion and volatility alter the slope of the demand curve. Rational agents hold
all risky assets at the equilibrium price, which correlates positively with the dividend
growth rate and negatively with risk aversion, the asset supply, and the volatility of the
dividend. When the dividend growth rate is high, the asset price is also high, but when
the risky asset is volatile, the asset price is low. Rational agents require compensation
for bearing risk, and high risk aversion consequently drives down asset prices. The risky
asset price is also affected by the riskless asset since the latter represents an alternative
investment opportunity. Higher expected returns on the riskless asset alter rational
agents’ investment strategies and prevent them from being willing to hold the risky asset.
To provide incentives, the risky asset price must decrease accordingly.
The risk-free rate is determined at time 0 by the central bank. At time 0, initial
consumption is Cr0 = rW
r
0 − r−δrγ +
γσ2DQ
2
2r . The central bank seeks to optimize utility at this
time, which leads to a corollary.
Corollary 4 Given the objective of the central bank, the optimal risk-free rate is:
r =
√√
γσ2DQ
2
2 +
δ
γ
Wr0
The optimal risk-free rate is determined by several economic variables, including
investors’ preferences, risky asset characteristics, and aggregated wealth in the economy.
The central bank plays a role only at time 0 in helping the economy determine a risk-free
rate, but does not participate in the general equilibrium after time 0. Investors thus do not
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consider the central bank’s role in the economy, and the risk-free rate is not influenced by
investors’ strategies.
Primary issues related to asset pricing theory are the equity premium and excess
volatility puzzles. The share equity premium is defined as the per-unit time expectation
for the sum of the excess price changes and dividends, and the return equity premium
is defined as the expectation for one dollar investment per unit of time less the risk-free
rate, which is similar to the risk premium from Mehra and Prescott (1985). The return
volatility is the diffusion term of the return process, which is expressed as the logarithm
of price. These measures are expressed as a corollary:
Corollary 5 In the economy, the share equity premium is:
E[(Dt − rPrt )dt + dPrt ]
dt
=
γQσ2D
r
the return equity premium is:
E[ERt] =
γQσ2D
rPt
and the return volatility is:
VolrRt =
σD
rPt
In this model, factors that influence equity premium include the risk-free rate,
uncertain dividends, risk aversion, and risky asset supplies. To solve the equity
premium puzzle, some researchers impose additional structures, especially time-varying
risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), recursive preferences (Bansal and Yaron
(2004)), and production models (Choi and Mertens (2006); Hirshleifer et al. (2015)).
Although these structures are compatible with our model, they are not the focus of the
paper. For simplicity and tractability, these structures are reserved for future extensions.
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We apply values from Barberis et al. (2015b) to obtain a numerical result. We also set
the dividend growth rate to 5% and dividend volatility to 25% so that the Sharpe ratio
matches real post-war data. Risk aversion γ is set to 0.1, and time discount rate δ is set
to 1.5%. The supply of the risky asset is set to 5. We further set the initial wealth in
the economy to 365. The central bank thus sets the optimal risk-free rate to 2.5%, which
accords with the historical average in the data Mehra (2003). In this economy, the return
equity premium is 0.96% and return volatility is 7.69%. Both numbers are much lower
than the 7.8% annual excess return and 17% volatility in the real data.
3.3 The MAX-CAPM
This section introduces a heterogeneous-agent, consumption-based capital asset pricing
model in a non-competitive market called MAX-CAPM. We assume that monopolistic
traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators coexist. Extrapolators act as irrational agents with
incorrect probability beliefs regarding risky asset prices. Instead of pursuing fundamental
value, they create expectations of future price changes based on sentiment, which is
modeled as a weighted average of past price changes. Arbitrageurs trade on price relative
to fundamental values. Monopolistic traders are rational in the sense that they are aware
of the true probability distribution of risky asset prices after incorporating the other two
agents’ strategies. They understand that their trades affect the equilibrium price, and
they consider their market power. A similar three heterogenous agents model can be
found in De Long et al. (1990b), who use a discrete-time, three-period context to study the
strategies and performance of feedback traders, passive traders, and rational speculators.
In their model, agents’ strategies are specified exogenously, and feedback traders have
very short memories regarding price changes. In our model, agents construct optimal
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strategies and extrapolators’ memories decay slowly.
3.3.1 The Setup
Consider a continuous-time, infinite-horizon economy in which uncertainty is
represented by a complete probability space of (Ω,F,P,Pe) and information filtration
of (Ft)t≥0, where P denotes the true probability measure and Pe extrapolators’ incorrect
probability. (Ft)t≥0 is the information set observed up to time t by extrapolators and
monopolistic traders. Unlike in the information-based model in which agents use
disparate information sets, in our model, extrapolators and the monopolistic traders share
the same information set but process information differently. Agents form strategies
based on probability beliefs of risky asset prices. For extrapolators, probability beliefs
shift from the true probability distribution by a monotonic function of sentiment, the
heterogeneity in beliefs that incurs trades.
3.3.2 Assets
Consider an economy with a single perishable consumption good that includes two
assets:
1. A risky asset with a fixed supply that generates an instantaneous dividend rate of Dt
and for which the market price is denoted by Pt. The dividend rate of Dt is governed by
diffusion:
dDt = gDdt + σDdZDt
where gD is the deterministic dividend growth rate and σD is volatility. We assume they
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are both positive and constant. dZDt is a Brownian motion under P. The benchmark
model shows that the fundamental price of this risky asset is determined by the dividend
process. The dividend process of the risky asset is not observable directly. Instead, if
agents have correct probability beliefs for the risky asset price, they are able to derive the
correct dividend process. However, the dividend processes under P and Pe are different.
2. A riskless asset with a constant rate of return r (r ≥ 0). At time 0, the central bank
assumes a rational economy and sets the risk-free rate to maximize utility at this time.
Risk-free rate r is given by corollary 4, and is constant thereafter.
3.3.3 Agents
There are three typical types of agents in the economy. The context of these three types of
agents is supported by various finance literature and empirical evidence.
Arbitrageurs
The first type of agents, arbitrageurs, believes that current mispricing will be corrected
in the long-run. They consequently trade against mispricing, defined as the difference
between the observed market price and fundamental value. Arbitrageurs’ demand for
the risky asset is
dNat = α[(P
r
t − Pt) − Nat ]dt + σadZat
Arbitrageurs’ demand is a mean-reverting Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with long-run
mean Prt − Pt, convergence rate α, and diffusion parameter σa. dZat is a Brownian motion
under P. The fundamental value is provided in the benchmark model with homogeneous
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rational agents, and market price is determined by general equilibrium, defined later.
Suppose that the market price is larger than the fundamental value so that there is a
price bubble. Arbitrageurs believe that the bubble will burst in the long-run and tend to
sell the risky asset. In this case, the long-run mean of their demand, Prt − Pt, is negative.
The same logic applies to a negative mispricing. When there is no mispricing, such that
the market price equals the fundamental value, arbitrageurs’ target demand is zero. In
this case, there is no arbitrage opportunity, and arbitrageurs exit the market. However,
the long-run mean is changing dynamically. When there is no arbitrage opportunity,
arbitrageurs seek to clear their positive position and exit the market. As they begin to
sell, asset prices drop and a misprice is created, and a new arbitrage opportunity appears.
A large α, a liquidity indicator, indicates that the market is liquid for arbitrageurs.
In this case, their demand converges to the long-run mean quickly. The inverse of the
diffusion parameter, σa, measures information precision among arbitrageurs, and a large
σa represents high noise in arbitrageurs’ information set, which prevents their strategy
from reverting to the long-run mean. Many studies investigate interactions between
informed and uninformed investors, suggesting that information precision determines
the equilibrium price. This paper incorporates this context in the sense that arbitrageurs
serve as uninformed investors, while monopolistic traders serve as informed investors.
Information precision indicates the difference in their information sets.
In some studies, arbitrageurs are strategic traders who consider counterparties’
strategies. De Long et al. (1990a) assume that rational arbitrageurs are aware of noise
traders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assume that arbitrageurs are institutional investors,
and concern that pessimistic traders become even more pessimistic prevents arbitrageurs
from taking large arbitrage positions. In these studies, risk aversion is relevant and
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arbitrageurs act as speculators. In contrast, our model considers arbitrageurs passive
investors who have bounded rationality and consider only fundamental value. The same
context can be found in De Long et al. (1990b), where passive investors’ trading strategies
depend only on price relative to fundamental value. De Long et al. (1990b) do not
address why arbitrageurs cannot eliminate mispricing, but this paper argues for this issue
from the limits of arbitrage, particularly from liquidity and information perspectives.
Arbitrageurs are rational since they observe mispricing and correct it in the long-run.
We endogenize arbitrageurs by having them incorporate the observed equilibrium price
in their strategies.
Extrapolators
The second type of agents, extrapolators, incorrectly believes that risky asset prices are
influenced by sentiment through channel:
dPet = (λ0 + λ1S t)dt + ~σPd ~Z
e
t
where λ0 and λ1 determine the drift of extrapolators’ conjectured risky asset price process.
We assume λ0 & 0 because extrapolators are bullish generally (De Long et al. (1990a);
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)). λ1 measures the influence of sentiment. In a market
in which extrapolators are more sensitive to sentiment (e.g., an emerging market), λ1
is expected to be large. ~σP is a two-dimensional vector of diffusion, and d ~Zet is a two-
dimensional Brownian motion under extrapolators’ subjective probability measure Pe.
The functional form of diffusion term ~σPd ~Zet is specified in Appendix B.
dPet = P
e
t+∆ − Pt represents extrapolators’ conjectured risky asset price process,
where Pt is the observed equilibrium price at time t, and Pet+∆ extrapolators’ conjectured
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equilibrium price after a period of ∆. Therefore, in Pe, the time t projection of time t + ∆
risky asset price is normally distributed as
Pet+∆|Pt ∼ N(Pt + (λ0 + λ1S t)∆, || ~σP∆||2)
At time t + ∆, extrapolators observe realized market price Pt+∆. They do not update their
strategies since Pt+∆ is in the domain of the distribution above. They instead simply
consider it a realization that is different from the expectation by normally distributed
random noise.
We apply the same setting as in Barberis et al. (2015b) to model sentiment and
extrapolators’ beliefs. Sentiment S t evolves according to diffusion:
dS t = −βS tdt + βdPt
where dS t = S t+∆ − S t is the change in sentiment, and dPt = Pt+∆ − Pt the change in market
price. It is an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with long-run mean zero that depends on price
changes. The sentiment process is specified as mean-reverting because people tend to
forget past events and enthusiasm fades. Price changes that occurred a month prior do not
have the same effect on sentiment as price changes that occurred today. β measures the
effect of price changes on sentiment. When β is large, sentiment is determined primarily
by the most recent price change. In this case, extrapolators tend to forget past events more
quickly. When β is low, even price changes in the distant past have a significant effect on
current sentiments.
Extrapolators hold incorrect beliefs in subjective probability measure Pe. At each time
t that they conjecture, sentiment evolves according to:
dS t = −βS tdt + βdPet
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Extrapolators also believe that the dividend evolves according to:
dDet = g
e
D(S t,N
a
t )dt + σDdZˆ
D
t
where their subjective dividend growth rate is specified in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Dividend growth rate geD(S t,N
a
t ) in extrapolators’ subjective probability measure is
determined implicitly and depends on sentiment S t and arbitrageurs’ strategy Nat .
In Pe, arbitrageurs’ demand process is:
d(Nat )
e = α( f [geD(S t,N
a
t )] − Nat )dt + σadZˆat
which is also an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. α is a liquidity indicator, and σa
measures information precision as defined in arbitrageurs’ strategies. Zˆat is a Brownian
motion under Pe. What arbitrageurs and extrapolators do not agree on is the long-run
mean. In Pe, long-run mean f [geD(S t,Nat )] is an increasing function of dividend drift
for extrapolators, which is also an increasing function of sentiment. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we assume f [geD(S t,N
a
t )] = S t throughout this paper. Therefore,
extrapolators believe that arbitrageurs trade on sentiment instead of mispricing.
Monopolistic Traders
Monopolistic traders always hold correct beliefs about the price process and arbitrageurs’
demand process. We derive monopolistic traders’ strategies in both competitive and non-
competitive markets, described below.
1. In a competitive market, monopolistic traders do not have market power. They are
more likely to be called smart or knowledgeable traders.
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2. In a non-competitive market, monopolistic traders have market power. They are
aware that their strategies will have significant influence on asset prices. They
incorporate this effect in their optimal strategy.
A typical example of a monopolistic trader is a large institutional investor with a
knowledgeable and experienced research team that is able to investigate the behaviors
of other market participants. They study sentiment formation among extrapolators
and constraints that arbitrageurs experience. In the second context above, monopolistic
traders also consider the price influence. In the literature, the roles of these three agents
sometimes overlap. For example, Sias et al. (2006) assume that institutional investors are
extrapolators, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that they are rational arbitrageurs. These
contexts can be incorporated into our model but are left to future research.
3.3.4 Market Clearing
The market clears in equilibrium, and supply always equals demand. The market clearing
condition is:
µ0Net + µ1N
a
t + µ2N
m
t = Q (3.1)
where µ0, µ1, and µ2 = 1−µ0−µ1 specify the relative mass of each type of agent. The market
clearing condition determines the equilibrium price endogenously. Given a fixed supply
of risky assets, when total demand increases or decreases, Pt also increases or decreases.
This condition therefore serves as a price impact function. A temporary or permanent
price impact function is usually specified exogenously in large trader and market
manipulation literature. This paper contributes to such literature by endogenizing the
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price impact function, which is embedded in the equilibrium model. We thus incorporate
large traders into the equilibrium model without requiring additional assumptions.
3.3.5 Equilibrium
A monopolistic traders–arbitrageurs–extrapolators rational expectations equilibrium
(MAX-REE) in an economy in which three heterogeneous agents coexist is defined as
consumption and investment strategies {(Cet ,Net ), (Cmt ,Nmt )}t≥0 and price process {Pt}t≥0 such
that:
1. Each agent chooses the consumption and investment strategy to maximize expected
utility given probability beliefs {P,Pe} and filtration (Ft)t≥0.
2. All agents share the same information set. Extrapolators hold incorrect beliefs,
arbitrageurs trade against mispricing, and monopolistic traders hold both correct
beliefs and market power.
3. Price Pt clears the security market.
3.3.6 Optimization Problem
Extrapolators
Extrapolators maximize expected CARA utility at time 0 given probability space (Ω,F,Pe)
and information filtration (Ft)t≥0 as
Ee0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
e
t
γ
dt

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subject to budget constraint and state variables processes:
dWet = (rW
e
t −Cet )dt + Net [(Dt − rPt)dt + dPet ]
= (rWet −Cet )dt + Net [(ee0 + eeSS t + eeNaNat )dt + ~σPd~Zet ]
dS t = β(−S t)dt + β(λ0 + λ1S t)dt + β ~σPd~Zet
= β[λ0 + (λ1 − 1)S t]dt + β ~σPd~Zet
dNat = α(S t − Nat )dt + σadZˆat
ee0, e
e
S , and e
e
Na are specified in Appendix B, and a superscript e is used to indicate
extrapolators’ probability measure of Pe. ee0 + e
e
SS t + e
e
NaN
a
t thus measures the expected
excess return for holding one share of risky asset under Pe, where the dynamic of risky
asset prices correlates positively with S t. Sentiment increases when there is a positive
price change, and the magnitude of the impact increases if the price change occurred
recently. Extrapolators also believe that the long-run equilibrium of arbitrageurs’ demand
depends on sentiment; when sentiment is high, extrapolators believe that arbitrageurs are
likely to increase their investments.
Monopolistic Traders and Competitive Market
In this case, monopolistic traders act like smart and knowledgeable traders in the sense
that they hold correct beliefs in a competitive market. All three types of agents are price-
takers. In this context, monopolistic traders are rational agents in the traditional asset
pricing model. Barberis et al. (2015a) use a model without the presence of arbitrageurs
to study interactions between extrapolators and rational agents. Monopolistic traders
maximize expected CARA utility at time 0 given the correct probability space: (Ω,F,P)
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and information filtration (Ft)t≥0 as
Em0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
m
t
γ
dt

subject to budget constraint and state variables processes:
dWmt = (rW
m
t −Cmt )dt + Nmt [(Dt − rPt)dt + dPt]
= (rWmt −Cmt )dt + Nmt [(em0 + emS S t + emNaNat )dt + ~σPd~Zt]
dS t = −βS tdt + βdPt
dNat = α[(P
r
t − Pt) − Nat ]dt + σadZat
em0 , e
m
S , and e
m
Nm are specified in Appendix B, and superscript m indicates monopolistic
traders. em0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NmN
a
t measures the expected excess return for holding one share of
risky asset under true measure P. Pt is the true price process of the risky asset, and Nat
is arbitrageurs’ true demand. Monopolistic traders use the true price process to update
expected sentiment, and they believe that arbitrageurs trade against mispricing. They are
aware of the limits of arbitrage, so arbitrageurs cannot always eliminate mispricing.
Monopolistic Traders and Non-Competitive Market
In this case, in addition to superior knowledge about the financial market and other
agents’ strategies, monopolistic traders also have market power. They incorporate the
endogenous price impact function into the optimal strategy. They maximize expected
CARA utility at time 0 given correct probability space (Ω,F,P) and information filtration
(Ft)t≥0 as:
Em0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
m
t
γ
dt

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subject to budget constraint and state variables processes:
dWmt = (rW
m
t −Cmt )dt + Nmt [(Dt − rPt)dt + dPt]
= (rWmt −Cmt )dt + Nmt [(em0 + emS S t + emNaNat + emNmNmt )dt + ~σPd~Zt]
dS t = −βS tdt + βdPt
dNat = α[(P
r
t − Pt) − Nat ]dt + σadZat
em0 , e
m
S , e
m
Na , and e
m
Nm are specified in Appendix B. Results in section 5 show that they are
different from the competitive MAX-CAPM. Additional term emNmN
m
t measures the impact
of monopolistic traders’ investments on the instantaneous excess return of one share of
risky asset. This term influences the equilibrium price through the optimization problem.
Market power offers monopolistic traders a trade-off. Higher demand increases overall
profit, but also drives up market prices and reduces per share expected return. Therefore,
an optimal solution exists. em0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NmN
a
t + e
m
NmN
m
t measures the expected excess return
for holding one share of risky asset under true measure P. Pt is the true price process of
the risky asset, and Nat is arbitrageurs’ true demand.
Monopolistic traders earn higher profit in non-competitive markets. To understand
this phenomenon, consider a firm’s profit maximization problem in standard economic
theory. In a competitive market, a firm acts as a price-taker and its revenue is the product
of exogenous unit price and quantity sold. In a non-competitive market, a firm acts as
a monopolist and its revenue is the product of endogenous unit price and quantity sold,
where the unit price is a function of quantity sold, derived from the consumer demand
curve. Based on microeconomic theory, monopolists always earn higher revenue because
of market power. The MAX-CAPM conveys similar logic; the expected excess return is
a function of each agent’s trading strategy, derived from the market clearing condition.
emNmN
m
t in the optimization problem reflects market power.
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3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we present equilibrium prices and optimal strategies in closed form for
the MAX-CAPM. Other results, including mispricing, equity premium, and asset return
volatility are also discussed.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Solutions
The model is developed in continuous-time. A dynamic programming approach (i.e., the
HJB equation) is used to derive PDEs, which describe agents’ value functions. A system
of polynomial equations is used to determine the parameters of the model and obtain a
proposition:
Proposition 5 In MAX-CAPM, there exists a rational expectation equilibrium such that:
• The equilibrium risky asset price is:
Pt = p0 +
Dt
r
+ pSS t + paNat (3.2)
• Extrapolators’ value function is:
Jet = −e−δt−rγWet +aeS 2t +be(Nat )
2+ceS tNat +d
eS t+eeNat + f
e
(3.3)
• Monopolistic traders’ value function is:
Jmt = −e−δt−rγWmt +amS 2t +bm(Nat )
2+cmS tNat +d
mS t+emNat + f
m
(3.4)
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p0, pS , pa, ae, be, ce, de, ee, f e, am, bm, cm, dm, em, f m are solutions to a system of fifteen polynomial
equations specified by {(B.9), (B.14), and (B.15)} in the competitive MAX-REE and {(B.9), (B.22),
and (B.23)} in the non-competitive MAX-REE.
The value functions are derived from each agent’s continuous-time, dynamic
programming problem. The idea is to rely on the HJB equation to obtain PDEs, and
then use a system of polynomials to determine the parameters of conjectured solutions to
the PDEs. According to the dynamic programming technique, applying Ito’s formula to
value functions produces drift-diffusion, and the optimal strategy optimizes each agent’s
value function so that the drift term equals zero in every state of the world. This condition
allows for optimal strategies and is invariant with state variables, while each agent’s
optimal utility is determined based on state variables.
A set of parameters, including the discount rate, risk aversion, liquidity, and
information precision, are used to describe the economy. Consistent with the example
in the benchmark model, we set the dividend growth rate to 5% and dividend volatility
to 25% so that the Sharpe ratio matches real post-war data. Risk aversion is set to 0.1 and
time discount to 1.5%. The supply of the risky asset is set to 5. We assume that β equals 0.5
so that both the previous sentiment and the current price change contribute to 50% of the
current sentiment. λ0 is set to 0.1 so investors are slightly bullish generally. The liquidity
indicator and information noise are normalized to one. Market shares of monopolistic
traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators are 50%, 10%, and 40%, respectively. Discussions
of the influence of these parameters appear in section 5.
The primary result of this paper is stated in Proposition 5. The equilibrium price
is a linear function of three state variables—Dt, S t, and Nat . Three parameters, p0, pS ,
and pa, are determined jointly by the current economy. In comparison to the benchmark
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model, the equilibrium price is influenced by two more state variables—sentiment and
arbitrageurs’ current position. pS describes the sensitivity of equilibrium prices to
sentiment. Using real-world data to construct a sentiment measure, Baker and Wurgler
(2006, 2007) show that high sentiment drives up current equilibrium prices and predicts
low future returns. Our solution indicates that a positive pS equals 0.74, which verifies
their finding. pa describes the sensitivity of equilibrium prices to arbitrageurs’ current
positions. Both monopolistic traders and extrapolators consider the arbitrageurs’ role
when constructing optimal strategies. However, since they hold disparate beliefs about
future asset prices, their beliefs about arbitrageurs’ strategies also differ. Monopolistic
traders believe that arbitrageurs trade against mispricing, but extrapolators believe that
they trade on sentiment. They agree that arbitrageurs are subject to the limits of arbitrage
so that their demand process is mean-reverting. The convergence rate is a liquidity
indicator. A more liquid market means that arbitrageurs’ demand converges to a long-
run mean more quickly. The diffusion term measures information noise. With more noise
in the market, arbitrageurs’ demand is more likely to deviate from their theoretical target.
Consistent with monopolistic traders’ beliefs, arbitrageurs trade on mispricing,
specified in a corollary:
Corollary 6 Mispricing of asset prices is the difference between the market equilibrium and
fundamental prices. Mathematically, mispricing, ∆t, is expressed as:
∆t = Pt − Prt
= (p0 − pr0) + pSS t + paNat
where
pr0 =
gD − γQσ2D
r2
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Similar to the equilibrium price, our solution demonstrates that mispricing is an
increasing function of sentiment and arbitrageurs’ positions. ∆t < 0 indicates a negative
asset price bubble and thus predicts high future returns. Extrapolators consider only
sentiment, and monopolistic traders and arbitrageurs always consider the fundamental
value and mispricing. Non-strategic arbitrageurs aim to correct mispricing, but strategic
monopolistic traders aim to take advantage of their knowledge and exploit other agents.
Monopolistic traders lower the current market price to generate high future returns,
and market power enables them to strengthen their strategies. The solution shows that
non-competitive MAX-CAPM generates a market price 27% lower than the fundamental
price, and competitive MAX-CAPM generates a market price of only 12% lower than the
fundamental price.
3.4.2 Dynamic of the Stochastic Process
Knowing that the equilibrium risky asset price is a function of state variables, the dynamic
of the stochastic process can be expressed explicitly as:
Corollary 7 The dynamics of the risky asset price evolve according to:
dPt =
1
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
+ paα(pr0 − p0) − (pSβ + papSα)S t − pa(pa + 1)αNat
]
dt
+ ~σPd~Zt
By introducing mispricing, the risky asset price process can also be expressed as:
dPt =
1
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
− paα(Nat − ∆t) − pSβS t
]
dt + ~σPd~Zt
.
(3.5)
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The risky asset price process is mean-reverting, with a long-run state equal to gDr .
MAX-CAPM and the benchmark model agree on the long-run state, which depends only
on the dividend growth rate and risk-free rate; it is invariant to investors’ strategies. Since
the dividend growth rate is constant and the risk-free rate is persistent after time 0, the
long-run state is constant after time 0.
The presence of extrapolators and arbitrageurs adds two components to the drift.
Sentiment S t has a negative impact on risky asset price, and the impact increases when
extrapolators are more sensitive to current price changes, or the equilibrium asset price
is more sensitive to sentiment. In a bullish market in which extrapolators’ sentiment
is high, the asset price tends to decrease. Since arbitrageurs trade on mispricing, the
difference between their current positions and mispricing also has a negative impact on
the risky asset price, and the impact increases when arbitrageurs experience less liquidity
constraints, or the equilibrium asset price is more sensitive to arbitrageurs’ strategies.
When there is a positive price bubble, the asset price tends to decrease. Intuitively,
extrapolators are less likely to trade when they pay more attention to the entire price
history, and arbitrageurs when they experience greater liquidity constraints. In this case,
the risky asset price is more stable. The convergence rate correlates positively with
extrapolators’ sensitivity to the current price change and the sensitivity of the equilibrium
price to sentiment:
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Corollary 8 The dynamics of sentiment and arbitrageurs’ positions evolve according to:
dS t =
β
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
+ paα(pr0 − p0) − (1 + papSα)S t − pa(pa + 1)αNat
]
dt
+ β ~σPd~Zt
=
β
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
− paα(Nat − ∆t) − S t
]
dt + β ~σPd~Zt
dNat = α[(p
r
0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat ]dt + σadZat
= α[−∆t − Nat ]dt + σadZat
(3.6)
The dynamic of the sentiment is mean-reverting, with a long-run state equal to
gD
r − paα(Nat − ∆t). Similar to the risky asset price process, the long-run state of sentiment
depends on the dividend growth and risk-free rates. The long-run state changes
dynamically with the difference between arbitrageurs’ current position and mispricing,
and it changes more rapidly with greater liquidity and more sensitive equilibrium prices.
In comparison to the dynamic of the risky asset price, the convergence rate of
sentiment shrinks by a factor β, as does the volatility of sentiment. Sentiment is
determined by both the current price change and price history. β measures the role
of current price change during sentiment formation; the lower the β, the more slowly
sentiment converges, and the less volatile sentiment is. In an extreme case in which β
equals one, extrapolators consider only the current price change such that sentiment and
the asset price move together. Since arbitrageurs trade against mispricing, the dynamic
of arbitrageurs’ positions is mean-reverting, with a long-run state equal to −∆t. They
experience liquidity constraints and information noise.
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3.4.3 Volatility
Corollary 9 In MAX-CAPM, the volatility of the risky asset price is:
~σP =
√
1
(1 − βpS )2 [(
σD
r
)2 + p2aσ2a]
and the volatility of risky asset return at any time t is ~σPPt , where Pt is the equilibrium asset price.
In comparison to the benchmark model, the volatility of risky asset price is
significantly higher in the presence of extrapolators and arbitrageurs. Volatility consists
of three components. σDr is the same as the volatility in the benchmark model; it is the
contribution from fundamental risk. βps measures the contribution from extrapolators,
and paσa measures that from arbitrageurs. Recall that σa represents information noise,
which causes arbitrageurs to trade unpredictably, thus adding variation in volatility. The
variation is strengthened by the sensitivity of equilibrium price to arbitrageurs’ current
position.
The solution produces a return volatility of 17%, as opposed to 8% from the
benchmark model. The 17% return matches the aggregated asset return volatility in the
post-war S&P 500 data. MAX-CAPM thus solves the excess volatility puzzle. Other
factors such as the economy and trading strategies affect volatility through ps and pa.
However, the ability to solve the excess volatility puzzle remains. An extensive analysis
appears in section 5.
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3.4.4 Equity Premium
Returns under Extrapolators’ Measure Pe
Proposition 6 The expected return of one share of a risky asset under extrapolators’ measure Pe
is:
ee0 + e
e
SS t + e
e
NaN
a
t
where ee0 = λ0 − rp0, eeS = λ1 − rpS , eeNa = −rpa.
For extrapolators, the expected per-share return depends positively on the average bullish
parameter, λ0. The return is negatively sensitive to arbitrageurs’ positions because it
is mean-reverting. The sensitivity of the per-share return to sentiment can go either
way. Extrapolators pay attention to the growth component and acknowledge that high
sentiment drives asset prices up. However, they believe that the asset price continues to
increase because of a multiplier of sentiment, which can be thought of as representing a
value component. The join effect determines the sign and magnitude of expected per-
share returns, such that the expected per-share return correlates positively to sentiment
only when the value component is significant enough to compensate for the growth
component. In this case, extrapolators’ demand increases with high sentiment.
Returns under the Real Measure P
Proposition 7 Under competitive MAX-CAPM, monopolistic traders do not have market power.
The expected return of one share of a risky asset under real measure P is:
em0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NaN
a
t
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where
em0 = −rp0 +
gD + αrpa(pr0 − p0)
r(1 − pSβ)
emS = −rpS −
pSβ + papSα
1 − pSβ
emNa = −rpa −
pa(pa + 1)α
1 − pSβ
Under the real measure, results suggest that the sensitivity of per-share return to
sentiment is negative, indicating that low sentiment, on average, predicts high future
returns. The sensitivity of per-share return to arbitrageurs’ positions is also negative,
which accords with the supply–demand relationship.
Competitive MAX-CAPM results produce an excess return of 1.53%, which is more
than the 0.96% excess return from the benchmark model. Using superior knowledge,
monopolistic traders accumulate wealth at the loss of extrapolators. However, excess
returns are still lower than the 7.8% return in post-war data. The equity premium puzzle
remains a puzzle, and we therefore introduce a proposition:
Proposition 8 Under non-competitive MAX-CAPM, monopolistic traders have market power.
The expected return of one share of a risky asset under real measure P is:
em0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NaN
a
t + e
m
NmN
m
t
where
em0 =
rγ ~σP
2Q
µ0
− (λ0 + βde ~σP2 + ee paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ ) +
gD/r + paα(pr0 − p0)
(1 − pSβ)
emS = −(λ1 + 2aeβ ~σP2 + ce
paσ2a
1 − pSβ ) −
pSβ + papSα
1 − pSβ
emNa = −
µ1rγ ~σP
2
µ0
− (ceβ ~σP2 + 2be paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ ) −
pa(pa + 1)α
1 − pSβ
emNm = −
µ2rγ ~σP
2
µ0
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Monopolistic traders experience a paradox. Increase in demand pushes the equilibrium
price up. Since low asset prices generate high future returns, they want to hold less of
the asset, but they also want to hold more to gain overall profit. Market power enables
monopolistic traders to construct an optimal strategy. By introducing heterogeneous
agents and market power, non-competitive MAX-CAPM produces an excess return of
7.51%, which matches real post-war data. In summary, non-competitive MAX-CAPM
solves the equity premium puzzle and excess volatility puzzle simultaneously while
maintaining a low and persistent risk-free rate, reasonable risk aversion, and return
predictability.
3.4.5 Optimal Trading Strategies
Corollary 10 Extrapolators’ and the monopolistic traders’ optimal demands are linear functions
of state variables given by:
Net = f
e
0 + f
e
S S t + f
e
NaN
a
t (3.7)
Nmt = f
m
0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t (3.8)
This corollary shows the optimal trading strategy for each agent, given his or her
probability belief. Extrapolators’ trading strategies are linear functions of sentiment and
arbitrageurs’ current positions. Results suggest a positive coefficient for sentiment and
a negative but negligible coefficient for arbitrageurs’ current positions. When there is
positive price change, extrapolators create bullish expectations of future price changes
and speculate that arbitrageurs will follow. Monopolistic traders’ strategies are also linear
functions of sentiment and arbitrageurs’ current positions. Results suggest negative
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coefficients for both sentiment and arbitrageurs’ current positions, where sensitivity to
arbitrageurs’ current positions is much larger.
3.5 Numerical Analysis
MAX-CAPM ensures an analytic solution for asset prices by solving a system of
polynomial equations. This section presents extensive analyses across various economies.
The equilibrium asset price and its sensitivity to state variables are studied. Asset return,
volatility, and trading strategies are also investigated. We also explore monopolistic
traders’ profitability to assess institutional investors.
The same parameters are chosen as in the previous section. The risk-free rate is set
by the central bank at time 0 to maximize utility at that time. The dividend growth rate
is 5%, the dividend volatility is 25%, risk aversion is 0.1, and the time discount factor
is 1.5%. For extrapolators, β is set to 0.5, and λ0 is set to 0.1 to indicate slightly bullish
beliefs. The benchmark liquidity indicator and information precision are normalized to
1. In the benchmark context, market shares of monopolistic traders, arbitrageurs, and
extrapolators are 50%, 10%, and 40%, respectively.
3.5.1 Limits of Arbitrage
Arbitrageurs trade against mispricing as:
dNat = α[−∆t − Nat ]dt + σadZat
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where ∆t represents mispricing at time t. The limits of arbitrage prevent arbitrageurs
from holding the target amount. This section investigates the limits of arbitrage from
two aspects—liquidity and information. α measures the convergence rate and serves as a
liquidity indicator, and diffusion parameter σa measures information noise, or the inverse
of information precision.
Liquidity
The liquidity experiences by arbitrageurs is measured by α. In empirical asset pricing
literature, several indicators are used to measure liquidity. For market liquidity,
common measures include effective bid–ask spreads, market depth, price resilience,
and a illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002). For funding liquidity, common
measures are TED spread and Libor-OIS spread. Hou et al. (2015) and Goyenko et al.
(2009) offer a comprehensive review of liquidity measures. We treat market and funding
liquidity as unified liquidity, and α measures the general liquidity condition. This context
is supported by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), who show that market and funding
liquidity interconnect, and that there is a spiral effect between the two. A larger α means
adequate liquidity for arbitrageurs to trade, and a smaller αmeans arbitrageurs’ strategies
converge to the long-run mean slowly. The liquidity indicator varies from 0.2 to 4 to
demonstrate the evolution of results from an illiquid to liquid market.
Figure B.1 shows excess returns in markets with different liquidity. In non-competitive
MAX-CAPM, the excess return falls between 7.5% and 8%, which aligns with post-war
data. Additional analyses show that the volatility is between 16% and 19%. Therefore,
varying the liquidity condition does not prevent MAX-CAPM from solving empirical
puzzles. In competitive MAX-CAPM, the excess return is more stable at 1.5%, and
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volatility is below 12%, both of which are much lower than post-war data.
Figure B.2 shows results for the equilibrium price. Since low prices predict high future
returns, monopolistic traders use their superior knowledge and market power to lower
asset prices. The difference between price and market prices becomes larger in illiquid
markets since arbitrageurs are unable to correct mispricing over time. In a competitive
market, the market price is 13% lower than the fundamental price, whereas in a non-
competitive market, market price is as much as 30% lower.
Figure B.3 shows that the expected profit collected by monopolistic traders over one
unit of time increases strictly with liquidity. Profit is the product of optimal demand
and per-share return. Knowing that arbitrageurs trade against mispricing, monopolistic
traders’ optimal demand increases in the same direction as per-share return, and market
power enables them to gain three times more profit.
Information Precision
A common topic in finance literature is the information-based asset pricing model. In an
economy with informed and uninformed investors, Wang (1993) shows that information
precision is a state variable that affects equilibrium price. Epstein and Schneider (2008)
find that investors dislike assets for which information quality is poor, especially when
underlying fundamentals are volatile, and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) show that prices
and uninformed demand decrease as information asymmetry increases. These decreases
are larger when more investors are uninformed, turnover is larger and more variable,
payoffs are more uncertain, and the lose signal is more precise.
Information precision is measured as the inverse of diffusion in arbitrageurs’
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strategies. Diffusion indicates the degree of information noise, which in this study
increases gradually from 0.2 to 4 such that information precision experienced by
arbitrageurs decreases and information asymmetry increases. Results appear in Figures
B.4, B.5, and B.6.
The previous section shows that holding everything else constant, information noise
correlates positively with the volatility of risky asset prices. Results demonstrate that
without holding other parameters constant, increasing information noise still increases
volatility of risky asset prices. The excess return increases with more information noise
since it introduces additional risk, as shown in Figure B.4. The excess return under non-
competitive MAX-CAPM is 7.50%, and under competitive MAX-CAPM is 1.50%. As
more information noise is added, Figure B.5 shows that the equilibrium price decreases
correspondingly, which corroborates findings from Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012).
A more liquid market and more information precision indicate an efficient market;
Figures B.2 and B.5 show that they both increase equilibrium price. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) argue that arbitrageurs’ information noise represents systematic risk that should be
priced because it lowers the equilibrium price. Covariance between equilibrium price and
information noise can be determined using the intertemporal capital asset pricing model
or arbitrage pricing theory. These efficient market approaches assume that arbitrageurs
see arbitrage opportunities and take them without constraint. Liquidity constraints, such
as concern for being liquidated, prevent arbitrageurs from keeping desired demands, and
lower the equilibrium price. The effect is stronger under non-competitive MAX-CAPM.
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3.5.2 Market Share
Extrapolators invest according to sentiment, but arbitrageurs invest based on mispricing.
The effect of market power depends not only on the economy and trading strategies,
but on relative market shares. An investor should consider relative market shares
when making investment decisions. One example is shifts between passive and active
management. Active management dominated the market and brought in large amounts
of excess returns during the first decade of the twenty-first century. As its market share
increased, returns decreased and investors switched to passive management. Change in
relative market shares again shifted returns and passive management gradually became
crowded, allowing active investments to outpace passive investments during 20172.
Changes to relative market shares can shift the performance of disparate strategies. In
this subsection, monopolistic traders’ expected returns and profit are investigated based
on investors’ varying market shares.
Market Share: Extrapolators
Since 2013, households directly own 38% of the U.S. equity market3, and a significant
portion of them are extrapolators. In this subsection, we fix the market shares of
arbitrageurs and vary relative market shares of extrapolators and monopolistic traders.
The market share of extrapolators is approximately 40%.
Figure B.7 shows positive sensitivity of equilibrium prices to sentiment. Increasing
the market shares of extrapolators leads more investors to form trading strategies based
on sentiment, increasing the influence of sentiment on equilibrium pricing. Figure
2https://www.investopedia.com/news/active-vs-passive-investing
3http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-stock-market-ownership-2013-3
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B.8 shows that the sensitivity of equilibrium prices to arbitrageurs’ position changes
as extrapolators’ market shares increase. Under non-competitive MAX-CAPM, the
equilibrium price decreases slightly with arbitrageurs’ current positions, and under
competitive MAX-CAPM, it increases significantly. Both extrapolators and monopolistic
traders evaluate arbitrageurs’ strategies; extrapolators believe that arbitrageurs trade on
sentiment, and monopolistic traders believe they trade on mispricing. Market power
strengthens the influences of beliefs.
Extrapolators drive price deviations and destabilize the market, and the volatility of
risky asset returns increase as extrapolators’ market shares increase. Theoretically, high
volatility lowers current prices and generates higher expected returns and profit. Results
suggest that this is true only in a competitive market. In a non-competitive market, as
market shares of monopolistic traders decrease and more concentrated market power
brings higher returns, each monopolistic trader is willing to hold more risky assets. This
incentive offsets influences from increases to risk and drives current prices up, while
expected excess returns decrease correspondingly. Since monopolistic traders’ optimal
demand increases while their expected returns decrease, their expected profit is convex
in extrapolators’ market shares and reaches a local minimum when extrapolators’ shares
are approximately 41%.
Market Share: Arbitrageurs
In this subsection, extrapolators’ market shares are fixed, and arbitrageurs’ and
monopolistic traders’ relative market shares vary. Figure B.13 and B.14 show the
sensitivity of equilibrium prices to state variables. The sensitivity to arbitrageurs’
positions increases with arbitrageurs’ market shares since higher participation leads to
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more influence of the equilibrium price. The direction of sensitivity to sentiment differs
between competitive and non-competitive markets. Generally, sentiment generates a high
equilibrium price, and extrapolators’ optimal demand under Pe deviates from optimal
demand under P because of incorrect beliefs. Knowing the negative relationship between
sentiment and future returns, monopolistic traders profit by exploring extrapolators’
strategies, and market power amplifies the consequences.
Arbitrageurs mitigate mispricing and stabilize the market. With more arbitrageurs
correcting mispricing, both extrapolators’ and monopolistic traders’ optimal demands
and the volatility of risky asset return decrease. Low volatility leads to low expected
returns and high equilibrium prices. Monopolistic traders’ profit depends on the gap
between arbitrageurs’ current and target positions. If arbitrageurs have a strong tendency
to buy or sell risky assets, each monopolistic trader’s expected profit increases or
decreases with arbitrageurs’ higher market shares.
Among empirical finance studies on institutional ownership, Jones et al. (1999),
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Bennett et al. (2003), and Parrino et al. (2003)
support the idea that increases to institutional ownership predicts asset returns positively.
They define institutions as investors (1) that are informed and have correct beliefs about
the distribution of future asset returns, and (2) whose trades have direct effects on asset
prices. The definition is analogous to monopolistic traders in our model, and analyses in
this subsection generate corroborating evidence. Under non-competitive MAX-CAPM,
expected returns increase as monopolistic traders’ market shares increase. Therefore,
the model provides a theoretical foundation for empirical research on institutional
ownership.
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3.5.3 State Variables
In this subsection, the economic context is reset to benchmark values. We show that
state variables influence not only equilibrium price, but also expected excess returns, and
generate a ”profit smile.”
Sentiment
We gradually increase sentiment. Figures B.19, B.20, and B.21 show results. The
equilibrium price increases with sentiment since the sensitivity of equilibrium price to
sentiment is strictly positive. Market power increases the influence of state variables.
The sensitivity to sentiment is 0.74 under non-competitive MAX-CAPM and 0.46 under
competitive MAX-CAPM, and sensitivity to arbitrageurs’ current positions is 0.14 under
non-competitive MAX-CAPM and 0.05 under competitive MAX-CAPM.
Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007); Huang et al. (2015) demonstrate that high sentiment
predicts low future returns. Results in Figure B.19 corroborate this finding. In our model,
high sentiment provides incentives for extrapolators to increase their demand, which
drives equilibrium prices up. With increasing sentiment, expected excess returns decrease
from 4.39% to −6.59% under competitive MAX-CAPM and more significantly decrease
from 14.92% to −13.95% under non-competitive MAX-CAPM .
Monopolistic traders are aware of the negative relationship between sentiment and
expected returns, and they construct trading strategies accordingly. When sentiment is
low, they buy risky assets, and when sentiment is high, they sell short instead. This
strategy generates huge profits at the cost of extrapolators’ losses, especially under
extreme sentiment scenarios. Figure B.21 shows a ”profit smile,” such that profit is non-
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negative and convex on sentiment. In a special case when arbitrageurs correct mispricing
caused by sentiment, monopolistic traders collect zero profit.
Arbitrageurs’ Positions
We gradually increase arbitrageurs’ positions. Figures B.22, B.23, and B.24 show results.
With an increase to arbitrageurs’ positions, expected excess returns decrease from 3.16%
to −1.91% under competitive MAX-CAPM and decrease more significantly from 13.09%
to −6.93% under non-competitive MAX-CAPM. Figure B.24 shows a ”profit smile,” such
that monopolistic traders’ profit is non-negative and convex on arbitrageurs’ current
position. In a special case when sentiment is zero and arbitrageurs hold all risky assets,
monopolistic traders collect zero profit.
3.6 Conclusion
Applying a consumption asset pricing model in a continuous-time environment, this
paper investigates the roles of three heterogeneous agents in financial market—monopolistic
traders, arbitrageurs, and extrapolators. A closed-form solution for equilibrium price
and optimal strategy is derived. Parameters of the solution are obtained by solving a
system of polynomials. By introducing a central bank, we endogenize the risk-free rate.
Non-competitive MAX-CAPM simultaneously reproduces many characteristics of asset
pricing while maintaining a low and persistent risk-free rate, reasonable risk aversion,
and return predictability. Market power enables monopolistic traders to generate high
expected excess returns, which accords with the equity premium puzzle. The volatility of
asset return is strengthened by sentiment and the limits of arbitrage, which explains the
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excess volatility puzzle. Both results match real post-war data in the U.S. equity market.
This paper assesses a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors in a
non-competitive market. It is the first non-competitive market general equilibrium asset
pricing model that endogenizes the price impact. The idea that the market clearing
condition serves as a price impact function sheds light on future research on this topic.
The model covers most types of players in the financial market, including irrational and
rational, informed and uninformed, passive and active, and individual and institutional
investors. The model proposes hypotheses and provides theoretical foundations for
several influential empirical asset pricing studies. For future research, it would be
interesting to explore interactions between assumptions and derive profitable investment
strategies. For example, the predictive power of sentiment under various institutional
ownership markets and liquidity conditions should be analyzed. Fama-French empirical
techniques should also be applied in this case.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
A.1 Arbitrageurs and Extrapolators’ Problems
Consider an economy with the time structure and asset structure described in section
2. At each time t, the arbitrageurs and extrapolators maximize a CARA utility on next
period wealth given by:
max
Nit
Eit
[
−e−γ(Wt+Nit (P˜t+1−Pt))
]
By assumption, although each agent has different beliefs about the expectation of P˜t+1,
it follows a normal distribution with variance equals to σ2 . So the expression inside the
expectation follows a log-normal distribution. Taking first order derivative with respect
to N it yields
N it =
Eit(P˜t+1) − Pt
γσ2
Arbitrageurs believe the asset price will return to fundamental value in the next
period, whose expectation equals to the current realized fundamental value due to the
structure of innovations. On the other hand, extrapolators believe the expected price
change of asset price is a weighted average of past price changes. They form their
expectations as follows
Eat (P˜t+1 − Pt) = P0 +
t∑
k=1
k − Pt
Eet (P˜t+1 − Pt) = (1 − θ)
t−1∑
k=1
θk−1(Pt−k − Pt−k−1) + θt−1X1
The results obtain by pluging in these expressions. 
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We start from the price impact function at time k − 1 and time k − 2, where k = 2, 3, ..., t
Pk−1 = Prk−1 −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
Xek−1 +
µmγσ2
µa
Nmk−1 (A.1)
Pk−2 = Prk−2 −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
Xek−2 +
µmγσ2
µa
Nmk−2 (A.2)
The extrapolators’ sentiment is a weighted average of previous price changes and
previous sentiment, this recursive relation gives us an expression for Xek
Xek = (1 − θ)(Pk−1 − Pk−2) + θXek−1
= [(1 − θ)µ
e
µa
+ θ]Xek−1 − (1 − θ)
µe
µa
Xek−2 + (1 − θ)[k−1 +
µmγσ2
µa
(Nmk−1 − Nmk−2)]
(A.3)
After some algebra we have
Xek − aXek−1 = b(Xek−1 − aXek−2) + Zk−1
where 
Zk−1 = (1 − θ)[k−1 + µ
mγσ2
µa
(Nmk−1 − Nmk−2)]
a + b = (1 − θ)µ
e
µa
+ θ
ab = (1 − θ)µ
e
µa
Let Yk = Xek − aXek−1, so that Y1 = Xe1 − aXe0 is given initially. Adding up the sequences we
have
Yk = bk−1Y1 +
k−1∑
i=1
bi−1Zk−i
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replace Yk by Xek
Xek = aX
e
k−1 + b
k−1Y1 +
k−1∑
i=1
bi−1Zk−i
Again, adding up the sequences we have
Xek =
k−1∑
j=1
a j−1bk− jY1 +
k−1∑
j=1
k− j∑
i=1
a j−1bi−1Zk+1− j−i + ak−1Xe1
After some algebra, Xek can be expressed as follows.
Xek =
ak − bk
a − b X
e
1 − ab
ak−1 − bk−1
a − b X
e
0
+ (1 − θ)η
k−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b (N
m
k−i − Nmk−i−1)
+ (1 − θ)
k−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b k−i
where η = µ
mγσ2
µa
. This gives us the result. 
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The price impact functions are obtained by plugging sentiment into the market clearing
conditions.
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Pt = Prt −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
Xet +
µmγσ2
µa
Nmt
= Prt −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
[
at − bt
a − b X
e
1 − ab
at−1 − bt−1
a − b X
e
0
]
+ (1 − θ)ηµ
e
µa
t−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b (N
m
t−i − Nmt−i−1) + ηNmt
+ (1 − θ)µ
e
µa
t−1∑
i=1
ai − bi
a − b t−i
This completes the proof.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Since the fundamental shock i follows a normal distribution, monopolistic traders’ time
1 utility follows a log-normal distribution. The expected utility can be transformed into a
mean-variance utility over the liquidation value as follows.
max
{Nmk }(1≤k≤T )
Em1
[
f (Nm
1
)
]
− 1
2
γVar
[
f (Nm
1
)
]
where
f (Nm
1
) = (PT − PT−1)NmT−1 +
T−2∑
i=1
(Pi+1 − Pi)Nmi + mP1
Applying the results in proposition 1 gives the expression in terms of monopolistic
traders’ trading history.
mP1 = m(Pr0 −
γσ2Q
µa
+
µe
µa
Xe1) + m1 + mηN
m
1
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(Pi+1 − Pi)Nmi =
µe
µa
(
ai+1 − bi+1
a − b −
ai − bi
a − b )X
e
1N
m
i
− µ
e
µa
ab(
ai − bi
a − b −
ai−1 − bi−1
a − b )X
e
0N
m
i
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)η
i∑
k=1
(
ai−k+1 − bi−k+1
a − b −
ai−k − bi−k
a − b )(N
m
k − Nmk−1)Nmi
+ ηNmi (N
m
i+1 − Nmi )
+ i+1Nmi +
µe
µa
(1 − θ)
i∑
k=1
(
ai−k+1 − bi−k+1
a − b −
ai−k − bi−k
a − b )kN
m
i
(PT − PT−1)NmT−1 =
µe
µa
(
aT − bT
a − b −
aT−1 − bT−1
a − b )X
e
1N
m
T−1
− µ
e
µa
ab(
aT−1 − bT−1
a − b −
aT−2 − bT−2
a − b )X
e
0N
m
T−1
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)η
T−1∑
k=1
(
aT−k − bT−k
a − b −
aT−k−1 − bT−k−1
a − b )(N
m
k − Nmk−1)NmT−1
− η(NmT−1)2
+ TNmT−1 +
µe
µa
(1 − θ)
T−1∑
k=1
(
aT−k − bT−k
a − b −
aT−k−1 − bT−k−1
a − b )kN
m
T−1
First order condition with respect to Nm1 yields:
0 = [
µe
µa
(1 − θ) − 2]ηNm1 + ηNm2
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)η
T−1∑
i=1
(
ai − bi
a − b −
ai−1 − bi−1
a − b )N
m
i
− µ
e
µa
(1 − θ)η
T−1∑
i=2
(
ai−1 − bi−1
a − b −
ai−2 − bi−2
a − b )N
m
i (A.4)
+
µe
µa
(a + b − 1)Xe1 −
µe
µa
abXe0 + [1 −
µe
µa
(1 − θ)]mη
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)1
− γσ2Nm1
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First order condition with respect to Nmj where (1 < j < T − 1) yields:
0 = η(Nmj+1 − 2Nmj + Nmj−1)
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)η
j∑
i=1
(
a j−k+1 − b j−k+1
a − b −
a j−k − b j−k
a − b )(N
m
k − Nmk−1)
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)η
T−1∑
i= j
(
ai− j+1 − bi− j+1
a − b −
ai− j − bi− j
a − b )N
m
j
− µ
e
µa
(1 − θ)η
T−1∑
i= j+1
(
ai− j − bi− j
a − b −
ai− j−1 − bi− j−1
a − b )N
m
j (A.5)
+
µe
µa
(
a j+1 − b j+1
a − b −
a j − b j
a − b )X
e
1 −
µe
µa
ab(
a j − b j
a − b −
a j−1 − b j−1
a − b )X
e
0
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)(a
j − b j
a − b −
a j−1 − b j−1
a − b )1
− γσ2Nmj − γ
j∑
k=2
(
a j−k+1 − b j−k+1
a − b −
a j−k − b j−k
a − b )
2[
µe
µa
(1 − θ)]2σ2Nmj
First order condition with respect to NmT−1 yields:
0 = η(−2NmT−1 + NmT−2) +
µe
µa
(1 − θ)ηNmT−1
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)η
T−1∑
k=1
(
aT−k − bT−k
a − b −
aT−k−1 − bT−k−1
a − b )(N
m
k − Nmk−1)
+
µe
µa
(
aT − bT
a − b −
aT−1 − bT−1
a − b )X
e
1 −
µe
µa
ab(
aT−1 − bT−1
a − b −
aT−2 − bT−2
a − b )X
e
0 (A.6)
+
µe
µa
(1 − θ)(a
T−1 − bT−1
a − b −
aT−2 − bT−2
a − b )1
− γσ2NmT−1 − γ
T−1∑
k=2
(
aT−k − bT−k
a − b −
aT−k−1 − bT−k−1
a − b )
2[
µe
µa
(1 − θ)]2σ2NmT−1
Equations A.4 - A.6 are T−1 linear equations with T−1 unknowns. Rearranging equations
A.4 - A.6 gives us the expression for A1 and b. 
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A.2.4 Proof of Corollary 1
The objective function f (Nm
1
) is a second order polynomial. If f (Nm
1
) is a concave
function with respect to unknowns, it will have unique optimal solution. Therefore, the
coefficient in front of each squared unknown has to be non-positive. Taking derivatives
for polynomial doesn’t change the sign of coefficients. The derivatives of each squared
unknown are the diagonal elements in A1, which should be non-positive to ensure an
optimal solution. 
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3
From the results in proposition 2, setting Nm0 = 0 yields the results. 
A.2.6 Proof of Corollary 3
The market manipulators’ optimal trading strategy Nm
1
= {Nm1 , ...,NmT }1 at time 1 is Nm1 =
X−1
1
y1. Where
y1 =

y1
y2
...
yT−1

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y1 = − µ
e
µa
(a + b − 1)Xe1 +
µe
µa
abXe0 − [1 −
µe
µa
(1 − θ)]mη − µ
e
µa
(1 − θ)1
y j = − µ
e
µa
(
a j+1 − b j+1
a − b −
a j − b j
a − b )X
e
1 +
µe
µa
ab(
a j − b j
a − b −
a j−1 − b j−1
a − b )X
e
0
− µ
e
µa
(1 − θ)(a
j − b j
a − b −
a j−1 − b j−1
a − b )1
yT−1 = − µ
e
µa
(
aT − bT
a − b −
aT−1 − bT−1
a − b )X
e
1 +
µe
µa
ab(
aT−1 − bT−1
a − b −
aT−2 − bT−2
a − b )X
e
0
− µ
e
µa
(1 − θ)(a
T−1 − bT−1
a − b −
aT−2 − bT−2
a − b )1
The initial position m equals to zero by the nature of market manipulator. Fundamental
shocks are i. Initial sentiments are Xe0 and X
e
1. In an economy without fundamental shock
and with zero initial sentiment we have y1 = 0, so that Nm1 = 0 as well. The monopolistic
traders’ optimal strategy is to not to trade. 
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A.3 Optimal Liquidation Strategies
(a) 3 Periods Trading Strategy, Cost = 0.0625
(b) 4 Periods Trading Strategy, Cost = 0.0601
(c) 5 Periods Trading Strategy, Cost = 0.0594
Figure A.1: Optimal Liquidation Strategy with no fundamental shock, no initial
sentiment, and θ equals to 0.75. The liquidation cost decreases with longer trading
horizons. Equilibrium prices first drop and then gradually recover.
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(a) 3 Periods Trading Strategy, Cost = 0.0720
(b) 4 Periods Trading Strategy, Cost = 0.0718
(c) 5 Periods Trading Strategy, Cost = 0.0627
Figure A.2: Optimal Liquidation Strategy with no fundamental shock, no initial
sentiment, and θ equals to 0.25. The liquidation cost decreases with longer trading
horizons. Equilibrium prices first drop and then rapidly recover.
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(a) Negative Initial Shock, Cost = 0.0720
(b) Zero Initial Shock, Cost = 0.0594
(c) Positive Initial Shock, Cost = 0.0333
Figure A.3: 5 Periods Optimal Liquidation Strategy with no initial sentiment, and θ equals
to 0.75. Initial fundamental shock increases from −0.05 to +0.05. The liquidation cost
decreases correspondingly. Equilibrium prices first drop and then recover.
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(a) Negative Initial Sentiment, Profit = 0.1979
(b) Zero Initial Sentiment, Cost = 0.0594
(c) Positive Initial Sentiment, Cost = 0.2087
Figure A.4: 5 Periods Optimal Liquidation Strategy with no fundamental shock, and θ
equals to 0.75. Initial sentiment switches from negative to positive. The liquidation cost
increases correspondingly.
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A.4 Market Manipulation Strategies
(a) 3 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 0.2000
(b) 4 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 0.2384
(c) 5 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 0.2402
Figure A.5: Market Manipulation Strategy with positive initial fundamental shock, no
initial sentiment, and θ equals to 0.75. An asset price bubble is created. The profit
increases with longer trading horizons.
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(a) 3 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 1.1020
(b) 4 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 1.2503
(c) 5 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 1.6340
Figure A.6: Market Manipulation Strategy with positive initial fundamental shock, no
initial sentiment, and θ equals to 0.5. A larger asset price bubble is created. The profit
increases with longer trading horizons.
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(a) 3 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 1.1020
(b) 4 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 1.2503
(c) 5 Periods Trading Strategy, Profit = 1.6340
Figure A.7: Market Manipulation Strategy with negative initial fundamental shock, no
initial sentiment, and θ equals to 0.75. A negative asset price bubble is created. Bear raid
strategy is stimulated. The profit increases with longer trading horizons.
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(a) Decreasing initial sentiment, Profit = 0.0959
(b) Flat initial sentiment, Profit = 0.0306
(c) Increasing initial sentiment, Profit = 0.0240
Figure A.8: Market Manipulation Strategy with no initial fundamental shock and θ equals
to 0.75. Sentiment at time 0 is negative. In panel (a) sentiment decreases at time 1 and
deviate further from zero; in panel (b) sentiment is flat; in panel (c) sentiment turns
positive.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proofs of Benchmark Model
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 4
The rational agent maximizes his expected utility at time 0
Er0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
r
t
γ
dt

subject to the budget constraint
dWrt = (rW
r
t −Crt )dt + Nrt [(Dt − rPrt )dt + dPrt ]
Assuming the derived value function is
Jrt (W
r
t ; t) ≡ max{Crs,Nrs }s≥t E
r
t
−
∞∫
t
e−δs−γC
r
s
γ
ds

Using Ito’s lemma and HJB equation, we are able to obtain the following PDE:
0 = −e
−δt−γCrt
γ
− δJr + JrWdWr +
1
2
JrWWdW
rdWr (B.1)
We conjecture, and later verify, that the value function and prices are given by
Prt = p
r
0 +
Dt
r
Jrt = −e−δt−rγWrt +cr
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So the PDE (B.1) can be transformed into
0 = r − δ − r[cr + log(rγ) + γNrt (−rpr0 +
gD
r
)] +
1
2
(rγ)2(
σD
r
)2(Nrt )
2 (B.2)
First order condition with respect to Nrt gives
0 = −rγ(−rpr0 +
gD
r
) + (rγ)2(
σD
r
)2Nrt
Plug in the optimal portfolio strategy Nrt = Q, we are able to solve for pr0 such that
pr0 = −r(
σD
r
)2Q +
gD
r2
(B.3)
Lastly, plug (B.3) into (B.2) to solve for the constant cr, the value function is then
Jrt = −e−δt−rγWrt +
r−δ
r −
γ2σ2DQ
2
2r −log(rγ) (B.4)
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
B.1.2 Proof of Corollary 4
The differential form of the price function gives:
dPrt =
gD
r
dt +
σD
r
dZDt
Thus σrP =
σD
r .
The risk premium is calculated as
E[(Dt − rPrt )dt + dPrt ]
dt
=
γQσ2D
r
This completes the proof. 
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B.2 Proofs of MAX-CAPMModel
B.2.1 Extrapolators’ Optimization Problem
Let’s first set up the optimization problem. Each extrapolator maximizes
Ee0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
e
t
γ
dt

subject to the budget constraint and state processes
dWet = (rW
e
t −Cet )dt + Net [(Dt − rPt)dt + dPet ]
= (rWet −Cet )dt + Net [(ee0 + eeSS t + eeNaNat )dt + ~σPd~Zet ]
dS t = β(−S t)dt + β(λ0 + λ1S t)dt + β ~σPd~Zet
= β[λ0 + (λ1 − 1)S t]dt + β ~σPd~Zet
dNat = α(S t − Nat )dt + σadZˆat
where ee0 = λ0 − rp0, eeS = λ1 − rpS , eeNa = −rpa.
In order to find the diffusion parameters ~σP, we first differentiate the conjectured price
function
dPt = pSdS t +
1
r
dDt + padNat
We then plug in the processes for dividend, sentiment, and arbitrageurs’ true demand.
The diffusion term of the price function is then
~σPd~Zt =
1
1 − βpS
(
σD
r
dZDt + paσadZ
a
t
)
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and
~σPd ~Zet =
1
1 − βpS
(
σD
r
dZˆDt + paσadZˆ
a
t
)
Assuming the derived value function for the extrapolators is
Jet (W
e
t ; S t,N
a
t ; t) ≡ max{Ces ,Nes }s≥t E
e
t
−
∞∫
t
e−δs−γC
e
s
γ
ds

Using Ito’s lemma and HJB equation, we are able to obtain the following PDE:
0 = − e
−δt−γCet
γ
− δJe + JeWdWe + JeSdS + JeNadNa
+
1
2
JeWWdW
edWe +
1
2
JeS SdS dS +
1
2
JeNaNadN
adNa
+ JeWSdW
edS + JeWNadW
edNa + JeS NadS dN
a
(B.5)
Now we conjecture the value function Jet has the form:
Jet = −e−δt−rγWe+aeS 2+be(Na)
2+ceS Na+deS+eeNa+ f e
The we can calculate the partial differentials:
JeW = −rγJe
JeS = (2a
eS + ceNa + de)Je
JeNa = (2b
eNa + ceS + ee)Je
JeWW = (rγ)
2Je
JeS S = [2a
e + (2aeS + ceNa + de)2]Je
JeNaNa = [2b
e + (2beNa + ceS + ee)2]Je
JeWS = −rγ(2aeS + ceNa + de)Je
JeWNa = −rγ(2beNa + ceS + ee)Je
JeS Na = [c
e + (2aeS + ceNa + de)(2beNa + ceS + ee)]Je
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Thus equation B.5 can be transformed into
0 = r − δ
− r
[
aeS 2t + b
e(Nat )
2 + ceS tNat + d
eS t + eeNat + f
e + log (rγ) + γNet (e
e
0 + e
e
SS t + e
e
NaN
a
t )
]
+ β(2aeS t + ceNat + d
e)(λ0 + (λ1 − 1)S t) + α(2beNat + ceS t + ee)(S t − Nat )
+
1
2
(rγ)2 ~σP
2(Net )
2 +
1
2
[2ae + (2aeS t + ceNat + d
e)2]β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
σ2a[2b
e + (2beNat + c
eS t + ee)2]
− rγβ(2aeS t + ceNat + de) ~σP2Net − rγ(2beNat + ceS t + ee)
paσ2a
1 − pSβN
e
t
+ [ce + (2aeS t + ceNat + d
e)(2beNat + c
eS t + ee)]β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
(B.6)
Take first order condition with respect to Net , we obtain the optimal portfolio strategy
0 = − rγ(ee0 + eeSS t + eeNaNat ) + (rγ)2 ~σP2Net − rγβ(2aeS t + ceNat + de) ~σP2
− rγ(2beNat + ceS t + ee)
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
Rearrange the above equation, we can represent Net in terms of a linear combination of
our state variables S t and Nat as
Net = f
e
0 + f
e
S S t + f
e
NaN
a
t (B.7)
where
f e0 =
ee0 + βd
e ~σP
2
+ ee paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2
f eS =
eeS + 2a
eβ ~σP
2
+ ce paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2
f eNa =
eeNa + c
eβ ~σP
2
+ 2be paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2
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Plug the optimal portfolio strategy back into the equation B.6, we obtain the following
quadratic equation in S and Na
0 = r − δ
− r[aeS 2t + be(Nat )2 + ceS tNat + deS t + eeNat + f e + log (rγ)]
− rγ( f e0 + f eS S t + f eNaNat )(ee0 + eeSS t + eeNaNat )
+ β(2aeS t + ceNat + d
e)(λ0 + (λ1 − 1)S t) + α(2beNat + ceS t + ee)(S t − Nat )
+
1
2
(rγ)2 ~σP
2( f e0 + f
e
S S t + f
e
NaN
a
t )
2 +
1
2
[2ae + (2aeS t + ceNat + d
e)2]β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
σ2a[2b
e + (2beNat + c
eS t + ee)2]
− rγβ ~σP2(2aeS t + ceNat + de)( f e0 + f eS S t + f eNaNat )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
eNat + c
eS t + ee)( f e0 + f
e
S S t + f
e
NaN
a
t )
+ β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ [c
e + (2aeS t + ceNat + d
e)(2beNat + c
eS t + ee)]
(B.8)
The above equation is valid for any value of S t and Nat , which implies the coefficients
of variables should be zero. That is
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0 = −rae − rγ f eS eeS + 2aeβ(λ1 − 1) + ceα +
1
2
(rγ)2 f eS
2 ~σP
2
+ 2ae2β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
ce2σ2a − 2ae f eS rγβ ~σP2
− ce f eS rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ + 2a
eceβ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
0 = −rbe − rγ f eNaeeNa − 2beα +
1
2
(rγ)2 f eNa
2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
ce2β2 ~σP
2
+ 2be2σ2a − ce f eNarγβ ~σP2
− 2be f eNarγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ + 2b
eceβ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
0 = −rce − rγ( f eS eeNa + f eNaeeS ) + βce(λ1 − 1) + α(2be − ce) + (rγ)2 f eS f eNa ~σP2 + 2aeceβ2 ~σP2
+ 2beceσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(2ae f eNa + ce f eS ) − rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (2b
e f eS + c
e f eNa) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (4a
ebe + ce2)
0 = −rde − rγ( f e0 eeS + f eS ee0) + β(2aeλ0 + de(λ1 − 1)) + αee + (rγ)2 ~σP2 f e0 f eS + 2aedeβ2 ~σP2 + ceeeσ2a
− rγβ ~σP2(2ae f e0 + de f eS ) − rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
e f e0 + e
e f eS ) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (2a
eee + cede)
0 = −ree − rγ( f e0 eeNa + f eNaee0) + βceλ0 − αee + (rγ)2 ~σP2 f e0 f eNa + cedeβ2 ~σP2 + 2beeeσ2a
− rγβ ~σP2(ce f e0 + de f eNa) − rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (2b
e f e0 + e
e f eNa) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
eee + 2bede)
0 = r − δ − r f e − r log (rγ) − rγ f e0 ee0 + βdeλ0 +
1
2
(rγ)2 f e0
2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
β2 ~σP
2(2ae + de2)
+
1
2
σ2a(2b
e + ee2) − rγβde f e0 ~σP2 − rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβe
e f e0 + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
e + deee)
(B.9)
Solving this quadratic equations system, we are able to determine the coefficients, so
as to pin down the optimal consumption and portfolio policies for extrapolators in terms
of state variables S t and Nat .
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B.2.2 Monopolistic Traders’ Optimization Problem CASE (a)
In this case the monopolistic trader are more like a ”smart trader” or ”knowledgeable
trader” in the sense that he has correct beliefs. The monopolistic traders have infinite
horizon at [0,∞). He tries to maximize the expected utility on the intial time 0
Em0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
m
t
γ
dt

subject to the budget constraint and state processes
dWmt = (rW
m
t −Cmt )dt + Nmt [(Dt − rPt)dt + dPt]
dS t = −βS tdt + βdPt
dNat = α[(P
r
t − Pt) − Nat ]dt + σadZat
where Pt is the true price process of risky asset and Nat is the arbitrageurs’ true demand.
In order to characterize investment opportunity in this economy, again we consider
the instantaneous excess return to one share of stock: dQmt = (Dt − rPt)dt + dPt, which
can also be thought as the return on a zero-wealth portfolio long one share of stock fully
financed by borrowing at the risk-free rate.
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dPt = pSdS t +
1
r
Dt + padNat
= −pSβS tdt + pSβdPt + 1r gDdt +
1
r
σDdZDt + paα(P
r
t − Pt − Nat )dt + paσadZat
=
1
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
+ paα(pr0 − p0) − (pSβ + papSα)S t − pa(pa + 1)αNat
]
dt
+
1
1 − pSβ (
σD
r
dZDt + paσadZ
a
t )
dQmt = (Dt − rPt)dt + dPt
= [(em0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NaN
a
t )]dt + ~σPd~Zt
Where ~σPd~Zt is specified before and em0 , e
m
S , and e
m
Na has the following form:
em0 = −rp0 +
gD + αrpa(pr0 − p0)
r(1 − pSβ)
emS = −rpS −
pSβ + papSα
1 − pSβ
emNa = −rpa −
pa(pa + 1)α
1 − pSβ
The monopolistic traders’ optimization problem now becomes
Em0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
m
t
γ
dt

subject to the budget constraint
dWmt = (rW
m
t −Cmt )dt + Nmt dQmt
= (rWmt −Cmt )dt + Nmt (em0 + emS S t + emNaNat )dt + Nmt ~σPd~Zt
dS t =
β
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
+ paα(pr0 − p0) − (1 + papSα)S t − pa(pa + 1)αNat
]
dt + β ~σPd~Zt
= (φm0 + φ
m
S S t + φ
m
NaN
a
t )dt + β ~σPd~Zt
dNat = α[(p
r
0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat ]dt + σadZat
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where
φm0 =
β
1 − pSβ
gD + αrpa(pr0 − p0)
r
φmS = −
β
1 − pSβ (1 + papSα)
φmNa = −
β
1 − pSβ pa(pa + 1)α
Assuming the derived value function for the extrapolators is
Jmt (W
m
t ; S t,N
a
t ; t) ≡ max{Cms ,Nms }s≥t E
m
t
−
∞∫
t
e−δs−γC
m
s
γ
ds

Using Ito’s lemma and HJB equation, we are able to obtain the following PDE:
0 = − e
−δt−γCmt
γ
− δJm + JmWdWm + JmS dS + JmNadNa
+
1
2
JmWWdW
mdWm +
1
2
JmSSdS dS +
1
2
JmNaNadN
adNa
+ JmWSdW
mdS + JmWNadW
mdNa + JmSNadS dN
a
(B.10)
We conjecture, and later verify, that the value function Jmt has the following form:
Jmt = −e−δt−rγWm+amS 2+bm(Na)
2+cmS Na+dmS+emNa+ fm
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The we can calculate the partial differentials:
JmW = −rγJm
JmS = (2a
mS + cmNa + dm)Jm
JmNa = (2b
mNa + cmS + em)Jm
JmWW = (rγ)
2Jm
JmSS = [2a
m + (2amS + cmNa + dm)2]Jm
JmNaNa = [2b
m + (2bmNa + cmS + em)2]Jm
JmWS = −rγ(2amS + cmNa + dm)Jm
JmWNa = −rγ(2bmNa + cmS + em)Jm
JmSNa = [c
m + (2amS + cmNa + dm)(2bmNa + cmS + em)]Jm
Thus equation B.10 can be transformed into
0 = r − δ
− r
[
amS 2t + b
m(Nat )
2 + cmS tNat + d
mS t + emNat + f
m + log (rγ) + γNmt (e
m
0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NaN
a
t )
]
+ (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(φm0 + φ
m
S S t + φ
m
NaN
a
t )
+ α(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)[(pr0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat ]
+
1
2
(rγ)2 ~σP
2(Nmt )
2 +
1
2
[2am + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)2]β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
σ2a[2b
m + (2bmNat + c
mS t + em)2]
− rγβ(2amS t + cmNat + dm) ~σP2Nmt − rγ(2bmNat + cmS t + em)
paσ2a
1 − pSβN
m
t
+ [cm + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)]β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
(B.11)
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Take first order condition with respect to Net , we obtain the optimal portfolio strategy
0 = − rγ(em0 + emS S t + emNaNat ) + (rγ)2 ~σP2Nmt − rγβ(2amS t + cmNat + dm) ~σP2
− rγ(2bmNat + cmS t + em)
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
Rearrange the above equation, we can represent Nmt in terms of a linear combination
of our state variables S t and Nat as
Nmt = f
m
0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t (B.12)
where
f m0 =
em0 + βd
m ~σP
2
+ em paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2
f mS =
emS + 2a
mβ ~σP
2
+ cm paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2
f mNa =
emNa + c
mβ ~σP
2
+ 2bm paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2
Plug the optimal portfolio strategy back into equation B.11, we obtain the following
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quadratic equation in S and Na
0 = r − δ
− r[amS 2t + bm(Nat )2 + cmS tNat + dmS t + emNat + f m + log (rγ)]
− rγ( f m0 + f mS S t + f mNaNat )(em0 + emS S t + emNaNat )
+ (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(φm0 + φ
m
S S t + φ
m
NaN
a
t )
+ α(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)[(pr0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat ]
+
1
2
(rγ)2 ~σP
2( f m0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t )
2 +
1
2
[2am + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)2]β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
σ2a[2b
m + (2bmNat + c
mS t + em)2]
− rγβ ~σP2(2amS t + cmNat + dm)( f m0 + f mS S t + f mNaNat )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
mNat + c
mS t + em)( f m0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t )
+ β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ [c
m + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)]
(B.13)
The above equation is valid for any value of S t and Nat , which implies the coefficients
of variables should be zero. That is
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0 = −ram − rγ f mS emS + 2amφmS − cmpSα +
1
2
(rγ)2 f mS
2 ~σP
2
+ 2am2β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
cm2σ2a
− 2am f mS rγβ ~σP2 − cm f mS rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ + 2a
mcmβ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
0 = −rbm − rγ f mNaemNa + cmφmNa − 2bm(pa + 1)α +
1
2
(rγ)2 f mNa
2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
cm2β2 ~σP
2
+ 2bm2σ2a − cm f mNarγβ ~σP2 − 2bm f mNarγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ + 2b
mcmβ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
0 = −rcm − rγ( f mS emNa + f mNaemS ) + (2amφmNa + cmφmS ) − α(2bmpS + cm(pa + 1))
+ (rγ)2 f mS f
m
Na ~σP
2
+ 2amcmβ2 ~σP
2
+ 2bmcmσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(2am f mNa + cm f mS )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
m f mS + c
m f mNa) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (4a
mbm + cm2)
0 = −rdm − rγ( f m0 emS + f mS em0 ) + (2amφm0 + dmφmS ) + α(−empS + (pr0 − p0)cm)
+ (rγ)2 ~σP
2 f m0 f
m
S + 2a
mdmβ2 ~σP
2
+ cmemσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(2am f m0 + dm f mS )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (c
m f m0 + e
m f mS ) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (2a
mem + cmdm)
0 = −rem − rγ( f m0 emNa + f mNaem0 ) + (cmφm0 + dmφmNa) + α(2bm(pr0 − p0) − em(pa + 1))
+ (rγ)2 ~σP
2 f m0 f
m
Na + c
mdmβ2 ~σP
2
+ 2bmemσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(cm f m0 + dm f mNa)
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
m f m0 + e
m f mNa) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
mem + 2bmdm)
0 = r − δ − r f m − r log (rγ) − rγ f m0 em0 + dmφm0 + αem(pr0 − p0) +
1
2
(rγ)2 f m0
2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
β2 ~σP
2(2am + dm2) +
1
2
σ2a(2b
m + em2) − rγβdm f m0 ~σP2 − rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβe
m f m0
+ β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
m + dmem)
(B.14)
Solving this quadratic equations system, we are able to determine the coefficients, so
as to pin down the optimal consumption and portfolio policies for monopolistic traders
in terms of state variables S t and Nat . The market clearing condition then implies
µ0( f e0 + f
e
S S t + f
e
NaN
a
t ) + µ1N
a
t + µ2( f
m
0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t ) = Q
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This is true for all S t and Nat , gives us three additional equations:
µ0 f e0 + µ2 f
m
0 − Q = 0 (B.15)
µ0 f eS + µ2 f
m
S = 0 (B.16)
µ0 f eNa + µ1 + µ2 f
m
Na = 0 (B.17)
By these three equations we are able to further pin down the coefficients p0, pS , and pa in
the price function. This is the explicit representation of the equilibrium price. 
B.2.3 Monopolistic Traders’ Optimization Problem CASE (b)
In this case the monopolistic traders have both market power and correct beliefs. He takes
the market clearing condition into consideration. The monopolistic traders have infinite
horizon at [0,∞). He tries to maximize the expected utility on the initial time 0
Em0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
m
t
γ
dt

subject to the budget constraint and state processes
dWmt = (rW
m
t −Cmt )dt + Nmt [(Dt − rPt)dt + dPt]
dS t = −βS tdt + βdPt
dNat = α[(P
r
t − Pt) − Nat ]dt + σadZat
where Pt is the true price process of risky asset and Nat is the arbitrageurs’ true demand.
In order to characterize investment opportunity in this economy, again we consider
the instantaneous excess return to one share of stock: dQmt = (Dt − rPt)dt + dPt, which
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can also be thought as the return on a zero-wealth portfolio long one share of stock fully
financed by borrowing at the risk-free rate.
dPt = pSdS t +
1
r
Dt + padNat
= −pSβS tdt + pSβdPt + 1r gDdt +
1
r
σDdZDt + paα(P
r
t − Pt − Nat )dt + paσadZat
=
1
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
+ paα(pr0 − p0) − (pSβ + papSα)S t − pa(pa + 1)αNat
]
dt
+
1
1 − pSβ (
σD
r
dZDt + paσadZ
a
t )
Since monopolistic traders have market power, by market clearing condition and
extrapolators’ optimal portfolio strategy, we have
µ0Net = µ0( f0 + fSS t + fNaN
a
t ) = Q − µ1Nat − µ2Nmt
Plug in the representations of f0, fS , fNa , and the price function, the above market clearing
condition can be transformed into
Net =
1
rγ ~σP
2
[
(λ0 + βde ~σP
2
+ ee
paσ2a
1 − pSβ ) + (λ1 + 2a
eβ ~σP
2
+ ce
paσ2a
1 − pSβ )S t
+(ceβ ~σP
2
+ 2be
paσ2a
1 − pSβ )N
a
t
]
− 1
γ ~σP
2 (p0 + pSS t + paN
a
t )
=
1
rγ ~σP
2
[
(λ0 + βde ~σP
2
+ ee
paσ2a
1 − pSβ ) + (λ1 + 2a
eβ ~σP
2
+ce
paσ2a
1 − pSβ )S t + (c
eβ ~σP
2
+ 2be
paσ2a
1 − pSβ )N
a
t
]
+
1
rγ ~σP
2 (Dt − rPt)
dQmt = (Dt − rPt)dt + dPt
= [(em0 + e
m
S S t + e
m
NaN
a
t + e
m
NmN
m
t )]dt + ~σPd~Zt
Where ~σPd~Zt is specified before and em0 , e
m
S , e
m
Na , and e
m
Nm has the following form:
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em0 =
rγ ~σP
2Q
µ0
− (λ0 + βde ~σP2 + ee paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ ) +
gD/r + paα(pr0 − p0)
(1 − pSβ)
emS = −(λ1 + 2aeβ ~σP2 + ce
paσ2a
1 − pSβ ) −
pSβ + papSα
1 − pSβ
emNa = −
µ1rγ ~σP
2
µ0
− (ceβ ~σP2 + 2be paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ ) −
pa(pa + 1)α
1 − pSβ
emNm = −
µ2rγ ~σP
2
µ0
The monopolistic traders’ optimization problem now becomes
Em0
−
∞∫
0
e−δt−γC
m
t
γ
dt

subject to the budget constraint
dWmt = (rW
m
t −Cmt )dt + Nmt dQmt
= (rWmt −Cmt )dt + Nmt (em0 + emS S t + emNaNat + emNmNmt )dt + Nmt ~σPd~Zt
dS t =
β
1 − pSβ
[gD
r
+ paα(pr0 − p0) − (1 + papSα)S t − pa(pa + 1)αNat
]
dt + β ~σPd~Zt
= (φm0 + φ
m
S S t + φ
m
NaN
a
t )dt + β ~σPd~Zt
dNat = α[(p
r
0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat ]dt + σadZat
where
φm0 =
β
1 − pSβ
gD + αrpa(pr0 − p0)
r
φmS = −
β
1 − pSβ (1 + papSα)
φmNa = −
β
1 − pSβ pa(pa + 1)α
Assuming the derived value function for the monopolistic traders is
Jmt (W
m
t ; S t,N
a
t ; t) ≡ max{Cms ,Nms }s≥t E
m
t
−
∞∫
t
e−δs−γC
m
s
γ
ds

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Using Ito’s lemma and HJB equation, we are able to obtain the following PDE:
0 = − e
−δt−γCmt
γ
− δJm + JmWdWm + JmS dS + JmNadNa
+
1
2
JmWWdW
mdWm +
1
2
JmSSdS dS +
1
2
JmNaNadN
adNa
+ JmWSdW
mdS + JmWNadW
mdNa + JmSNadS dN
a
(B.18)
We conjecture, and later verify, that the value function Jmt has the following form:
Jmt = −e−δt−rγWm+amS 2+bm(Na)
2+cmS Na+dmS+emNa+ fm
The we can calculate the partial differentials:
JmW = −rγJm
JmS = (2a
mS + cmNa + dm)Jm
JmNa = (2b
mNa + cmS + em)Jm
JmWW = (rγ)
2Jm
JmSS = [2a
m + (2amS + cmNa + dm)2]Jm
JmNaNa = [2b
m + (2bmNa + cmS + em)2]Jm
JmWS = −rγ(2amS + cmNa + dm)Jm
JmWNa = −rγ(2bmNa + cmS + em)Jm
JmSNa = [c
m + (2amS + cmNa + dm)(2bmNa + cmS + em)]Jm
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Thus equation B.18 can be transformed into
0 = r − δ
− r
[
amS 2t + b
m(Nat )
2 + cmS tNat + d
mS t + emNat + f
m + log (rγ)
]
− rγNmt (em0 + emS S t + emNaNat + emNmNmt )
+ (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(φm0 + φ
m
S S t + φ
m
NaN
a
t )
+ α(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)((pr0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat )
+
1
2
(rγ)2 ~σP
2(Nmt )
2 +
1
2
[2am + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)2]β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
σ2a[2b
m + (2bmNat + c
mS t + em)2]
− rγβ(2amS t + cmNat + dm) ~σP2Nmt − rγ(2bmNat + cmS t + em)
paσ2a
1 − pSβN
m
t
+ [cm + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)]β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
(B.19)
Take first order condition with respect to Net , we obtain the optimal portfolio strategy
0 = − rγ(em0 + emS S t + emNaNat ) − 2rγemNmNmt + (rγ)2 ~σP2Nmt − rγβ(2amS t + cmNat + dm) ~σP2
− rγ(2bmNat + cmS t + em)
paσ2a
1 − pSβ
Rearrange the above equation, we can represent Nmt in terms of a linear combination
of our state variables S t and Nat as
Nmt = f
m
0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t (B.20)
where
f m0 =
em0 + βd
m ~σP
2
+ em paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2 − 2emNm
f mS =
emS + 2a
mβ ~σP
2
+ cm paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2 − 2emNm
f mNa =
emNa + c
mβ ~σP
2
+ 2bm paσ
2
a
1−pS β
rγ ~σP
2 − 2emNm
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Plug the optimal portfolio strategy back into equation B.19, we obtain the following
quadratic equation in S and Na
0 = r − δ
− r[amS 2t + bm(Nat )2 + cmS tNat + dmS t + emNat + f m + log (rγ)]
− rγ( f m0 + f mS S t + f mNaNat )(em0 + emS S t + emNaNat ) − rγemNm( f m0 + f mS S t + f mNaNat )2
+ (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(φm0 + φ
m
S S t + φ
m
NaN
a
t )
+ α(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)((pr0 − p0) − pSS t − (pa + 1)Nat )
+
1
2
(rγ)2 ~σP
2( f m0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t )
2 +
1
2
[2am + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)2]β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
σ2a[2b
m + (2bmNat + c
mS t + em)2]
− rγβ ~σP2(2amS t + cmNat + dm)( f m0 + f mS S t + f mNaNat )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
mNat + c
mS t + em)( f m0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t )
+ β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ [c
m + (2amS t + cmNat + d
m)(2bmNat + c
mS t + em)]
(B.21)
The above equation is valid for any value of S t and Nat , which implies the coefficients
of variables should be zero. That is
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0 = −ram − rγ f mS emS + 2amφmS − cmpSα +
1
2
(rγ)2 f mS
2 ~σP
2
+ 2am2β2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
cm2σ2a
− 2am f mS rγβ ~σP2 − cm f mS rγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ + 2a
mcmβ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ − rγe
m
Nm( f
m
S )
2
0 = −rbm − rγ f mNaemNa + cmφmNa − 2bm(pa + 1)α +
1
2
(rγ)2 f mNa
2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
cm2β2 ~σP
2
+ 2bm2σ2a − cm f mNarγβ ~σP2 − 2bm f mNarγ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ + 2b
mcmβ
paσ2a
1 − pSβ − rγe
m
Nm( f
m
Na)
2
0 = −rcm − rγ( f mS emNa + f mNaemS ) + (2amφmNa + cmφmS ) − α(2bmpS + cm(pa + 1))
+ (rγ)2 f mS f
m
Na ~σP
2
+ 2amcmβ2 ~σP
2
+ 2bmcmσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(2am f mNa + cm f mS )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
m f mS + c
m f mNa) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (4a
mbm + cm2) − 2rγemNm f mS f mNa
0 = −rdm − rγ( f m0 emS + f mS em0 ) + (2amφm0 + dmφmS ) + α(−empS + (pr0 − p0)cm)
+ (rγ)2 ~σP
2 f m0 f
m
S + 2a
mdmβ2 ~σP
2
+ cmemσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(2am f m0 + dm f mS )
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (c
m f m0 + e
m f mS ) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (2a
mem + cmdm) − 2rγemNm f m0 f mS
0 = −rem − rγ( f m0 emNa + f mNaem0 ) + (cmφm0 + dmφmNa) + α(2bm(pr0 − p0) − em(pa + 1))
+ (rγ)2 ~σP
2 f m0 f
m
Na + c
mdmβ2 ~σP
2
+ 2bmemσ2a − rγβ ~σP2(cm f m0 + dm f mNa)
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβ (2b
m f m0 + e
m f mNa) + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
mem + 2bmdm) − 2rγemNm f m0 f mNa
0 = r − δ − r f m − r log (rγ) − rγ f m0 em0 + dmφm0 + αem(pr0 − p0)
+
1
2
(rγ)2 f m0
2 ~σP
2
+
1
2
β2 ~σP
2(2am + dm2) +
1
2
σ2a(2b
m + em2) − rγβdm f m0 ~σP2
− rγ paσ
2
a
1 − pSβe
m f m0 + β
paσ2a
1 − pSβ (c
m + dmem) − rγemNm( f m0 )2
(B.22)
Solving this quadratic equations system, we are able to determine the coefficients, so
as to pin down the optimal consumption and portfolio policies for monopolistic traders
in terms of state variables S t and Nat . The market clearing condition then implies
µ0( f e0 + f
e
S S t + f
e
NaN
a
t ) + µ1N
a
t + µ2( f
m
0 + f
m
S S t + f
m
NaN
a
t ) = Q
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This is true for all S t and Nat , gives us three additional equations:
µ0 f e0 + µ2 f
m
0 − Q = 0 (B.23)
µ0 f eS + µ2 f
m
S = 0 (B.24)
µ0 f eNa + µ1 + µ2 f
m
Na = 0 (B.25)
By these three equations we are able to further pin down the coefficients p0, pS , and pa in
the price function. This is the explicit representation of the equilibrium price. 
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B.3 The Limits of Arbitrage
(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.1: Liquidity: excess return
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.2: Liquidity: equilibrium price
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.3: Liquidity: profit
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.4: Information: excess return
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.5: Information: equilibrium price
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.6: Information: profit
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B.4 Extrapolators Market Share
(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.7: Extrapolators market share: sensitivity to sentiment
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.8: Extrapolators market share: sensitivity to arbitrageurs
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.9: Extrapolators market share: equilibrium price
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.10: Extrapolators market share: excess return
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.11: Extrapolators market share: volatility
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.12: Extrapolators market share: profit
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B.5 Arbitrageurs Market Share
(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.13: Arbitrageurs market share: sensitivity to sentiment
124
(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.14: Arbitrageurs market share: sensitivity to arbitrageurs
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.15: Arbitrageurs market share: equilibrium price
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.16: Arbitrageurs market share: excess return
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.17: Arbitrageurs market share: volatility
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.18: Arbitrageurs market share: profit
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B.6 State Variables
(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.19: Sentiment and excess return
130
(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.20: Sentiment and equilibrium price
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.21: Sentiment and profit
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.22: Arbitrageurs and excess return
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.23: Arbitrageurs and equilibrium price
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(a) Market Power
(b) No Market Power
Figure B.24: Arbitrageurs and profit
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B.7 Matlab Code
B.7.1 Solving Non-Competitive MAX-CAPM
% Numerically Solve the equilibrium parameters
% The manipulator does have market power. They are aware that their
demand
% will affect expected portfolio return.
% There are 15 parameters, 6 associate with extrapolators’ optimal
% strategy, 6 associate with manipulator’s optimal strategy, and the
rest 3
% associate with the equilibrium price
% First we assign value to model parameters. Then we apply Matlab
standard
% package to solve second order polynomial equations system with 15
% equations and 15 unknowns. Some condition may be applied to rule out
% multiple solutions.
% The standard packages we consider are: vpasolve
solutions = zeros(20,25);
% Parameter Value
% Extrapolators
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beta= 0.5;
lambda0= 0.1;
lambda1= 0.9;
% Fundamental
r= 0.025;
g_D= 0.05; %normal
sigma_D= 0.25;
gamma= 0.1;
delta= 0.015;
Q= 5;
% Arbitrageurs
alpha= 1; %volatility of arbitrageur
sigma_a = 1;
P_r = -gamma*sigma_Dˆ2*Q/rˆ2 + g_D/rˆ2;
% end of parameter values specification
for i = 1:20
% Market weight
mu0= 0.4;
mu1= 0.05+0.0035*i;
mu2= 1-mu0-mu1;
% Define variables
syms a_e b_e c_e d_e e_e f_e a_m b_m c_m d_m e_m f_m p_0 p_s p_a;
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% define the system of polynomials to solve parameters of
extrapolators’
% problem
e0e = lambda0 - r * p_0;
eSe = lambda1 - r * p_s;
eae = -r * p_a;
fact = (1-p_s*beta);
sigmap2 = (sigma_Dˆ2/rˆ2+p_aˆ2*sigma_aˆ2)/factˆ2;
f0e = (e0e+beta*d_e*sigmap2+e_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fSe =
(eSe+2*a_e*beta*sigmap2+c_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fae =
(eae+c_e*beta*sigmap2+2*b_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
eqn1 = 0 == -r*a_e - r*gamma*fSe*eSe + 2*a_e*beta*(lambda1-1) +
c_e*alpha + 1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*fSeˆ2*sigmap2 + 2*a_eˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2
+ 1/2*c_eˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- 2*a_e*fSe*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
c_e*fSe*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*a_e*c_e*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact;
eqn2 = 0 == -r*b_e - r*gamma*fae*eae - 2*b_e*alpha +
1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*faeˆ2*sigmap2 + 1/2*c_eˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2 +
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2*b_eˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- c_e*fae*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
2*b_e*fae*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*b_e*c_e*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact;
eqn3 = 0 == -r*c_e - r*gamma*(fSe*eae+fae*eSe) + beta*c_e*(lambda1-1)
+ alpha*(2*b_e-c_e) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*fSe*fae*sigmap2 +
2*a_e*c_e*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ 2*b_e*c_e*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_e*fae+c_e*fSe) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_e*fSe+c_e*fae) ...
+ beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(4*a_e*b_e+c_eˆ2);
eqn4 = 0 == -r*d_e - r*gamma*(f0e*eSe+fSe*e0e) +
beta*(2*a_e*lambda0+d_e*(lambda1-1)) + alpha*e_e +
(r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0e*fSe + 2*a_e*d_e*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ c_e*e_e*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_e*f0e+d_e*fSe) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_e*f0e+e_e*fSe) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*a_e*e_e+c_e*d_e);
eqn5 = 0 == -r*e_e - r*gamma*(f0e*eae+fae*e0e) + beta*c_e*lambda0 -
alpha*e_e + (r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0e*fae + c_e*d_e*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ 2*b_e*e_e*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(c_e*f0e+d_e*fae) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_e*f0e+e_e*fae) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_e*e_e+2*b_e*d_e);
eqn6 = 0 == r - delta - r*f_e - r*log(r*gamma) - r*gamma*f0e*e0e +
beta*d_e*lambda0 + 1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*f0eˆ2*sigmap2 +
1/2*betaˆ2*sigmap2*(2*a_e+d_eˆ2) ...
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+ 1/2*sigma_aˆ2*(2*b_e+e_eˆ2) - r*gamma*beta*d_e*f0e*sigmap2 -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*e_e*f0e +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_e+d_e*e_e);
% define the system of polynomials to solve parameters of manipulator’s
% problem when they have market power
p0r = (g_D-gamma*Q*sigma_Dˆ2)/rˆ2;
e0m = r*gamma*sigmap2*Q/mu0 -
(lambda0+beta*d_e*sigmap2+e_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact) +
(g_D/r+p_a*alpha*(p0r-p_0))/fact;
eSm = -(lambda1+2*a_e*beta*sigmap2+c_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact) -
(p_s*beta+p_a*p_s*alpha)/fact;
eam = -mu1*r*gamma*sigmap2/mu0 -
(c_e*beta*sigmap2+2*b_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact) -
p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha/fact;
emm = -mu2*r*gamma*sigmap2/mu0;
p0m = beta/fact*(g_D+alpha*r*p_a*(p0r-p_0))/r;
pSm = -beta/fact*(1+p_a*p_s*alpha);
pam = -beta/fact*p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha;
f0m =
(e0m+beta*d_m*sigmap2+e_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2-2*emm);
fSm =
(eSm+2*a_m*beta*sigmap2+c_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2-2*emm);
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fam =
(eam+c_m*beta*sigmap2+2*b_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2-2*emm);
eqn7 = 0 == -r*a_m - r*gamma*fSm*eSm + 2*a_m*pSm - c_m*p_s*alpha +
1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*fSmˆ2*sigmap2 + 2*a_mˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2 +
1/2*c_mˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- 2*a_m*fSm*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
c_m*fSm*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*a_m*c_m*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact - r*gamma*emm*fSmˆ2;
eqn8 = 0 == -r*b_m - r*gamma*fam*eam + c_m*pam - 2*b_m*(p_a+1)*alpha +
1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*famˆ2*sigmap2 + 1/2*c_mˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2 +
2*b_mˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- c_m*fam*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
2*b_m*fam*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*b_m*c_m*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact - r*gamma*emm*famˆ2;
eqn9 = 0 == -r*c_m - r*gamma*(fSm*eam+fam*eSm) + (2*a_m*pam+c_m*pSm) -
alpha*(2*b_m*p_s+c_m*(p_a+1)) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*fSm*fam*sigmap2 +
2*a_m*c_m*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ 2*b_m*c_m*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_m*fam+c_m*fSm) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_m*fSm+c_m*fam) ...
+ beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(4*a_m*b_m+c_mˆ2) - 2*r*gamma*emm*fSm*fam;
eqn10 = 0 == -r*d_m - r*gamma*(f0m*eSm+fSm*e0m) + (2*a_m*p0m+d_m*pSm)
+ alpha*(-e_m*p_s+(p0r-p_0)*c_m) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0m*fSm +
2*a_m*d_m*betaˆ2*sigmap2 + c_m*e_m*sigma_aˆ2 ...
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- r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_m*f0m+d_m*fSm) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_m*f0m+e_m*fSm) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*a_m*e_m+c_m*d_m) ...
- 2*r*gamma*emm*f0m*fSm;
eqn11 = 0 == -r*e_m - r*gamma*(f0m*eam+fam*e0m) + (c_m*p0m+d_m*pam) +
alpha*(2*b_m*(p0r-p_0)-e_m*(p_a+1)) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0m*fam +
c_m*d_m*betaˆ2*sigmap2 + 2*b_m*e_m*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(c_m*f0m+d_m*fam) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_m*f0m+e_m*fam) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_m*e_m+2*b_m*d_m) ...
- 2*r*gamma*emm*f0m*fam;
eqn12 = 0 == r - delta - r*f_m - r*log(r*gamma) - r*gamma*f0m*e0m +
d_m*p0m + alpha*e_m*(p0r-p_0) + 1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*f0mˆ2*sigmap2 +
1/2*betaˆ2*sigmap2*(2*a_m+d_mˆ2) ...
+ 1/2*sigma_aˆ2*(2*b_m+e_mˆ2) - r*gamma*beta*d_m*f0m*sigmap2 -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*e_m*f0m +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_m+d_m*e_m) ...
- r*gamma*emm*f0mˆ2;
% market clearing condition
eqn13 = 0 == mu0*f0e + mu2*f0m - Q;
eqn14 = 0 == mu0*fSe + mu2*fSm;
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eqn15 = 0 == mu0*fae + mu1 + mu2*fam;
% numerical polynomial solver
S =
vpasolve([eqn1,eqn2,eqn3,eqn4,eqn5,eqn6,eqn7,eqn8,eqn9,eqn10,eqn11,eqn12,eqn13,eqn14,eqn15],
[a_e,b_e,c_e,d_e,e_e,f_e,a_m,b_m,c_m,d_m,e_m,f_m,p_0,p_s,p_a]);
a_e= S.a_e;
b_e= S.b_e;
c_e= S.c_e;
d_e= S.d_e;
e_e= S.e_e;
f_e= S.f_e;
a_m= S.a_m;
b_m= S.b_m;
c_m= S.c_m;
d_m= S.d_m;
e_m= S.e_m;
f_m= S.f_m;
p_0= S.p_0;
p_s= S.p_s;
p_a= S.p_a;
e0e = lambda0 - r * p_0;
eSe = lambda1 - r * p_s;
eae = -r * p_a;
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fact = (1-p_s*beta);
sigmap2 = (sigma_Dˆ2/rˆ2+p_aˆ2*sigma_aˆ2)/factˆ2;
f0e = (e0e+beta*d_e*sigmap2+e_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fSe =
(eSe+2*a_e*beta*sigmap2+c_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fae =
(eae+c_e*beta*sigmap2+2*b_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
p0r = (g_D-gamma*Q*sigma_Dˆ2)/rˆ2;
e0m = r*gamma*sigmap2*Q/mu0 -
(lambda0+beta*d_e*sigmap2+e_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact) +
(g_D/r+p_a*alpha*(p0r-p_0))/fact;
eSm = -(lambda1+2*a_e*beta*sigmap2+c_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact) -
(p_s*beta+p_a*p_s*alpha)/fact;
eam = -mu1*r*gamma*sigmap2/mu0 -
(c_e*beta*sigmap2+2*b_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact) -
p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha/fact;
emm = -mu2*r*gamma*sigmap2/mu0;
p0m = beta/fact*(g_D+alpha*r*p_a*(p0r-p_0))/r;
pSm = -beta/fact*(1+p_a*p_s*alpha);
pam = -beta/fact*p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha;
f0m =
(e0m+beta*d_m*sigmap2+e_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2-2*emm);
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fSm =
(eSm+2*a_m*beta*sigmap2+c_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2-2*emm);
fam =
(eam+c_m*beta*sigmap2+2*b_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2-2*emm);
solutions(i,1)= a_e;
solutions(i,2)= b_e;
solutions(i,3)= c_e;
solutions(i,4)= d_e;
solutions(i,5)= e_e;
solutions(i,6)= f_e;
solutions(i,7)= a_m;
solutions(i,8)= b_m;
solutions(i,9)= c_m;
solutions(i,10)= d_m;
solutions(i,11)= e_m;
solutions(i,12)= f_m;
solutions(i,13)= p_0;
solutions(i,14)= p_s;
solutions(i,15)= p_a;
solutions(i,16)= f0e;
solutions(i,17)= fSe;
solutions(i,18)= fae;
solutions(i,19)= f0m;
solutions(i,20)= fSm;
solutions(i,21)= fam;
solutions(i,22)= e0m;
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solutions(i,23)= eSm;
solutions(i,24)= eam;
solutions(i,25)= emm;
end
xlswrite(’MP_Arbitraguer_Wt.xlsx’,solutions);
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B.7.2 Solving Competitive MAX-CAPM
% Numerically solve the equilibrium parameters
% The manipulator doesn’t have market power.
% There are 15 parameters, 6 associate with extrapolators’ optimal
% strategy, 6 associate with manipulator’s optimal strategy, and the
rest 3
% associate with the equilibrium price
% First we assign value to model parameters. Then we apply Matlab
standard
% package to solve second order polynomial equations system with 15
% equations and 15 unknowns. Some condition may be applied to rule out
% multiple solutions.
% The standard packages we consider are: vpasolve.
solutions = zeros(20,24);
% Parameter Value
% Extrapolators
beta= 0.5;
lambda0= 0.1;
lambda1= 0.9;
% Fundamental
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r= 0.025;
g_D= 0.05; %normal
sigma_D= 0.25;
gamma= 0.1;
delta= 0.015;
Q= 5;
% Arbitrageurs
alpha= 1; %volatility of arbitrageur
sigma_a = 1;
% end of parameter values specification
for i = 1:20
% Market weight
mu0= 0.4;
mu1= 0.05+0.0035*i;
mu2= 1-mu0-mu1;
% Define variables
syms a_e b_e c_e d_e e_e f_e a_m b_m c_m d_m e_m f_m p_0 p_s p_a;
% define the system of polynomials to solve parameters of
extrapolators’
% problem
e0e = lambda0 - r * p_0;
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eSe = lambda1 - r * p_s;
eae = -r * p_a;
fact = (1-p_s*beta);
sigmap2 = (sigma_Dˆ2/rˆ2+p_aˆ2*sigma_aˆ2)/factˆ2;
f0e = (e0e+beta*d_e*sigmap2+e_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fSe =
(eSe+2*a_e*beta*sigmap2+c_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fae =
(eae+c_e*beta*sigmap2+2*b_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
eqn1 = 0 == -r*a_e - r*gamma*fSe*eSe + 2*a_e*beta*(lambda1-1) +
c_e*alpha + 1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*fSeˆ2*sigmap2 + 2*a_eˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2
+ 1/2*c_eˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- 2*a_e*fSe*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
c_e*fSe*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*a_e*c_e*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact;
eqn2 = 0 == -r*b_e - r*gamma*fae*eae - 2*b_e*alpha +
1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*faeˆ2*sigmap2 + 1/2*c_eˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2 +
2*b_eˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- c_e*fae*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
2*b_e*fae*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*b_e*c_e*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact;
eqn3 = 0 == -r*c_e - r*gamma*(fSe*eae+fae*eSe) + beta*c_e*(lambda1-1)
+ alpha*(2*b_e-c_e) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*fSe*fae*sigmap2 +
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2*a_e*c_e*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ 2*b_e*c_e*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_e*fae+c_e*fSe) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_e*fSe+c_e*fae) ...
+ beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(4*a_e*b_e+c_eˆ2);
eqn4 = 0 == -r*d_e - r*gamma*(f0e*eSe+fSe*e0e) +
beta*(2*a_e*lambda0+d_e*(lambda1-1)) + alpha*e_e +
(r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0e*fSe + 2*a_e*d_e*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ c_e*e_e*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_e*f0e+d_e*fSe) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_e*f0e+e_e*fSe) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*a_e*e_e+c_e*d_e);
eqn5 = 0 == -r*e_e - r*gamma*(f0e*eae+fae*e0e) + beta*c_e*lambda0 -
alpha*e_e + (r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0e*fae + c_e*d_e*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ 2*b_e*e_e*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(c_e*f0e+d_e*fae) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_e*f0e+e_e*fae) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_e*e_e+2*b_e*d_e);
eqn6 = 0 == r - delta - r*f_e - r*log(r*gamma) - r*gamma*f0e*e0e +
beta*d_e*lambda0 + 1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*f0eˆ2*sigmap2 +
1/2*betaˆ2*sigmap2*(2*a_e+d_eˆ2) ...
+ 1/2*sigma_aˆ2*(2*b_e+e_eˆ2) - r*gamma*beta*d_e*f0e*sigmap2 -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*e_e*f0e +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_e+d_e*e_e);
% define the system of polynomials to solve parameters of manipulator’s
% problem
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p0r = (g_D-gamma*Q*sigma_Dˆ2)/rˆ2;
e0m = -r*p_0 + (g_D/r+alpha*p_a*(p0r-p_0))/fact;
eSm = -r*p_s - (p_s*beta+p_a*p_s*alpha)/fact;
eam = -r*p_a - p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha/fact;
p0m = beta/fact*(g_D+alpha*r*p_a*(p0r-p_0))/r;
pSm = -beta/fact*(1+p_a*p_s*alpha);
pam = -beta/fact*p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha;
f0m = (e0m+beta*d_m*sigmap2+e_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fSm =
(eSm+2*a_m*beta*sigmap2+c_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fam =
(eam+c_m*beta*sigmap2+2*b_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
eqn7 = 0 == -r*a_m - r*gamma*fSm*eSm + 2*a_m*pSm - c_m*p_s*alpha +
1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*fSmˆ2*sigmap2 + 2*a_mˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2 +
1/2*c_mˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- 2*a_m*fSm*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
c_m*fSm*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
2*a_m*c_m*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact;
eqn8 = 0 == -r*b_m - r*gamma*fam*eam + c_m*pam - 2*b_m*alpha*(p_a+1) +
1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*famˆ2*sigmap2 + 1/2*c_mˆ2*betaˆ2*sigmap2 +
2*b_mˆ2*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- c_m*fam*r*gamma*beta*sigmap2 -
2*b_m*fam*r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact +
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2*b_m*c_m*beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact;
eqn9 = 0 == -r*c_m - r*gamma*(fSm*eam+fam*eSm) + (2*a_m*pam+c_m*pSm) -
alpha*(2*b_m*p_s+c_m*(p_a+1)) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*fSm*fam*sigmap2 +
2*a_m*c_m*betaˆ2*sigmap2 ...
+ 2*b_m*c_m*sigma_aˆ2 - r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_m*fam+c_m*fSm) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_m*fSm+c_m*fam) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(4*a_m*b_m+c_mˆ2);
eqn10 = 0 == -r*d_m - r*gamma*(f0m*eSm+fSm*e0m) + (2*a_m*p0m+d_m*pSm)
+ alpha*(-e_m*p_s+(p0r-p_0)*c_m) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0m*fSm +
2*a_m*d_m*betaˆ2*sigmap2 + c_m*e_m*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(2*a_m*f0m+d_m*fSm) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_m*f0m+e_m*fSm) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*a_m*e_m+c_m*d_m);
eqn11 = 0 == -r*e_m - r*gamma*(f0m*eam+fam*e0m) + (c_m*p0m+d_m*pam) +
alpha*(2*b_m*(p0r-p_0)-e_m*(p_a+1)) + (r*gamma)ˆ2*sigmap2*f0m*fam +
c_m*d_m*betaˆ2*sigmap2 + 2*b_m*e_m*sigma_aˆ2 ...
- r*gamma*beta*sigmap2*(c_m*f0m+d_m*fam) -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(2*b_m*f0m+e_m*fam) +
beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_m*e_m+2*b_m*d_m);
eqn12 = 0 == r - delta - r*f_m - r*log(r*gamma) - r*gamma*f0m*e0m +
d_m*p0m + alpha*e_m*(p0r-p_0) + 1/2*(r*gamma)ˆ2*f0mˆ2*sigmap2 +
1/2*betaˆ2*sigmap2*(2*a_m+d_mˆ2) ...
+ 1/2*sigma_aˆ2*(2*b_m+e_mˆ2) - r*gamma*beta*d_m*f0m*sigmap2 -
r*gamma*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*e_m*f0m +
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beta*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact*(c_m+d_m*e_m);
% market clearing condition
eqn13 = 0 == mu0*f0e + mu2*f0m - Q;
eqn14 = 0 == mu0*fSe + mu2*fSm;
eqn15 = 0 == mu0*fae + mu1 + mu2*fam;
% numerical polynomial solver
S =
vpasolve([eqn1,eqn2,eqn3,eqn4,eqn5,eqn6,eqn7,eqn8,eqn9,eqn10,eqn11,eqn12,eqn13,eqn14,eqn15],
[a_e,b_e,c_e,d_e,e_e,f_e,a_m,b_m,c_m,d_m,e_m,f_m,p_0,p_s,p_a]);
a_e= S.a_e;
b_e= S.b_e;
c_e= S.c_e;
d_e= S.d_e;
e_e= S.e_e;
f_e= S.f_e;
a_m= S.a_m;
b_m= S.b_m;
c_m= S.c_m;
d_m= S.d_m;
e_m= S.e_m;
f_m= S.f_m;
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p_0= S.p_0;
p_s= S.p_s;
p_a= S.p_a;
e0e = lambda0 - r * p_0;
eSe = lambda1 - r * p_s;
eae = -r * p_a;
fact = (1-p_s*beta);
sigmap2 = (sigma_Dˆ2/rˆ2+p_aˆ2*sigma_aˆ2)/factˆ2;
f0e = (e0e+beta*d_e*sigmap2+e_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fSe =
(eSe+2*a_e*beta*sigmap2+c_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fae =
(eae+c_e*beta*sigmap2+2*b_e*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
p0r = (g_D-gamma*Q*sigma_Dˆ2)/rˆ2;
e0m = -r*p_0 + (g_D/r+alpha*p_a*(p0r-p_0))/fact;
eSm = -r*p_s - (p_s*beta+p_a*p_s*alpha)/fact;
eam = -r*p_a - p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha/fact;
p0m = beta/fact*(g_D+alpha*r*p_a*(p0r-p_0))/r;
pSm = -beta/fact*(1+p_a*p_s*alpha);
pam = -beta/fact*p_a*(p_a+1)*alpha;
f0m = (e0m+beta*d_m*sigmap2+e_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
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fSm =
(eSm+2*a_m*beta*sigmap2+c_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
fam =
(eam+c_m*beta*sigmap2+2*b_m*p_a*sigma_aˆ2/fact)/(r*gamma*sigmap2);
solutions(i,1)= a_e;
solutions(i,2)= b_e;
solutions(i,3)= c_e;
solutions(i,4)= d_e;
solutions(i,5)= e_e;
solutions(i,6)= f_e;
solutions(i,7)= a_m;
solutions(i,8)= b_m;
solutions(i,9)= c_m;
solutions(i,10)= d_m;
solutions(i,11)= e_m;
solutions(i,12)= f_m;
solutions(i,13)= p_0;
solutions(i,14)= p_s;
solutions(i,15)= p_a;
solutions(i,16)= f0e;
solutions(i,17)= fSe;
solutions(i,18)= fae;
solutions(i,19)= f0m;
solutions(i,20)= fSm;
solutions(i,21)= fam;
solutions(i,22)= e0m;
solutions(i,23)= eSm;
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solutions(i,24)= eam;
end
xlswrite(’NMP_Arbitrageur_Wt.xlsx’,solutions);
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